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STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW1 
The Commission restates the issues identified by 
Mandell as follows: 
Issue I: Whether the Commission applied the correct 
legal standard to determine the character and nature of the 
settlement proceeds as the first step before concluding that 
the proceeds were taxable Utah source income? 
Standard of Review: This is an issue of law and the 
correction of error standard applies. Utah Code Ann. § 59-
1-610(1) (b) (West 2004) . 
Issue II: Whether Mandell failed to meet his burden by 
adequately marshaling sufficient evidence supporting the 
1
 Mandell raised in his third issue a statute of 
limitations issue, but failed to address the issue 
substantively in his argument. The Court has held that it 
will not address claims unsupported by legal argument. 
Green v. Louder, 2001 UT 62, 134, 29 P.3d 638. In any 
event, the Commission's deficiency determination made in 
2003 was within the applicable limitations period. No 
limitation period applies since no return was filed for the 
2001 tax year. If the 1998 return triggers the limitations 
period, the deficiency was made within six years. Utah Code 
Ann. §§ 59-10-536(3) (a) and 59-10-536 (9) (b) (West 2004); (R. 
250, Respondent's Ex. 1.) 
Commission's finding of fact that the settlement "proceeds 
are in lieu of the funds Mr. Mandell should have received at 
the time . . . he sold the stock in [HAU] . . . ." If 
Mandell has meet his burden, is this finding supported by 
substantial evidence? 
Standard of Review: This is an issue of fact. 
Findings of fact of the Commission are granted deference and 
a substantial evidence standard applies. Utah Code Ann. § 
59-1-610(1) (a) (West 2004) . 
Issue III: If the settlement proceeds are in lieu of 
the sale proceeds from the stock sale, did the Commission 
correctly find that these proceeds are Utah source income? 
Standard of Review: This is a mixed question of fact 
and law. However, the findings of fact are not in dispute 
and the only issue before the Court is an issue of law. 
Commission's findings of law are granted no deference and a 
correction of error standard applies. Utah Code Ann. § 59-
1-610(1)(b). 
2 
DETERMINATIVE STATUES AND RULES2 
Utah Code Ann. § 59-7-701(2000): 
An S corporation, except one described in 
Subsection 59-7-102(2) shall be taxed for state 
purposes in the same manner as taxed for federal 
purposes as provided in Subtitle A, Chapter IS, 
Internal Revenue Code, and as modified by this 
chapter. The tax rate for S corporations shall be 
the rate provided for corporations under Section 
59-7-104. Taxes owed under this section shall be 
subject to the estimated tax payments as provided 
in Section 59-7-504. 
Utah Code Ann. § 59-7-702(2000): 
(1) Except as provided in Subsection (2), items of 
Utah taxable income, expenses, losses, and credits 
shall be passed through to the shareholders and be 
taxed as provided in Subtitle A, Chapter IS, Part 
2, Internal Revenue Code. 
(2)(a) A resident shareholder shall recognize his 
proportionate share of an S corporation's Utah 
taxable income. 
(b) A nonresident shareholder shall recognize 
that portion of an S corporation's Utah taxable 
income derived from Utah sources as provided in 
Section 59-10-117 and 59-10-118. 
Utah Code Ann. § 59-10-116(2000): 
(See Addendum A.) 
Utah Code Ann. §59-10-117(1), (2)(a)(2000): 
(1) For the purpose of Section 59-10-116, federal 
adjusted gross income derived from Utah sources 
2
 The determinative statutes have remained materially 
identical in 1998, 2001 and currently. Only § 59-10-116 has 
been revised, effective January 1, 2002. The 2002 revision 
does not alter the arguments. 
3 
shall include those items includable in federal 
"adjusted gross income" (as defined by Section 62 
of the Internal Revenue Code) attributable to or 
resulting from: 
(a) the ownership in this state of any 
interest in real or tangible personal 
property (including real property or 
property rights from which "gross income 
from mining" as defined by Section 613(c) 
of the Internal Revenue Code is derived); 
or 
(b) the carrying on of a business, trade, 
profession, or occupation in this state. 
* * * 
(2)(d) a nonresident shareholder's distributive 
share of ordinary income, gain, loss, and 
deduction derived from or connected with Utah 
sources shall be determined under Section 59-10-
118. 
Utah Code Ann. § 59-10-118 (2), (5) and (8) (2000): 
(2) Any taxpayer having business income which is 
taxable both within and without this state, shall 
allocate and apportion his net income as provided 
in this section. 
* * * 
(5) (a) Capital gains and losses from sales of real 
property located in this state are allocable to 
this state. 
(b) Capital gains and losses from sales of 
tangible personal property are allocable to this 
state if: 
(i) the property had a situs in this state at 
the time of the sale; or 
(ii) the taxpayer's commercial domicile is in 
this state and the taxpayer is not taxable in the 
state in which the property had a situs. 
(c) Capital gains and losses from sales of 
intangible personal property are allocable to this 
4 
state if the taxpayer's commercial domicile is in 
this state. 
•k ~k ~k 
(8) All business income shall be apportioned to 
this state by multiplying the income by a 
fraction, the numerator of which is the property 
factor plus the payroll factor plus the sales 
factor, the denominator of which is three. 
(See Addendum A for complete statute.) 
Utah Code Ann. § 59-10-536(2000): 
(See Addendum A.) 
26 U.S.C. § 1366(b) (2001) : 
Character passed through.--The character of any 
item included in a shareholder's pro rata share 
under paragraph (1) of subsection (a) shall be 
determined as if such item were realized directly 
from the source from which realized by the 
corporation, or incurred in the same manner as 
incurred by the corporation. 
26 U.S.C. § 338(a), (b) and (h) (10) (2001) : 
(a) General rule.-- For purposes of this subtitle, 
if a purchasing corporation makes an election 
under this section (or is treated under subsection 
(e) as having made such an election), then, in the 
case of any qualified stock purchase, the target 
corporation-
(1) shall be treated as having sold all of its 
assets at the close of the acquisition date at 
fair market value in a single transaction, and 
(2) shall be treated as a new corporation which 
purchased all of the assets referred to in 
paragraph (1) as of the beginning of the day after 
the acquisition date. 
5 
(b) Basis of assets after deemed purchase.--
(1) In general.--For purposes of subsection (a), the 
assets of the target corporation shall be treated as 
purchased for an amount equal to the sum of-
(A) the grossed-up basis of the purchasing 
corporation's recently purchased stock, and 
(B) the basis of the purchasing corporation's 
nonrecently purchased stock. 
* * * 
(h) (10) Elective recognition of gain or loss by 
target corporation, together with nonrecognition 
of gain or loss on stock sold by selling 
consolidated group.--
(A) In general.--Under regulations prescribed by 
the Secretary, an election may be made under which 
if-
(i) the target corporation was, before the 
transaction, a member of the selling consolidated 
group, and 
(ii) the target corporation recognizes gain or 
loss with respect to the transaction as if it sold 
all of its assets in a single transaction, then 
the target corporation shall be treated as a 
member of the selling consolidated group with 
respect to such sale, and (to the extent provided 
in regulations) no gain or loss will be recognized 
on stock sold or exchanged in the transaction by 
members of the selling consolidated group. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS/STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Deficiency Notice 
This case arises from a Statutory Notice of Estimated 
Income Tax issued on October 23, 2003 by the Auditing 
Division of the Utah State Tax Commission (the "Commission") 
to Petitioners/Appellants, Dennis Mandell and Kathy Mandell 
(collectively the "Mandells" and, in reference to Dennis 
6 
Mandell, "Mandell"). (R. 41, I 1; R. 250, Respondent's Ex. 
1.) This notice reported a deficiency in Utah state income 
tax for the tax year 2001 of $70,129.62, excluding 
applicable interest and penalties. Ld. The deficiency 
related to $1,127,977.00 in settlement proceeds reported by 
Mandell on his 2001 Form 1040 Federal Income Tax Return, 
Schedule D, as a capital gain related to the sale of his 
interest in Homes America of Utah, Inc., a Utah corporation, 
THAU"). (R. 45, 51 35, 40; R. 250, Respondent's Ex. 2.) 
The Sale of HAU 
In 1998, Champion Home Centers, Inc. ("Champion") 
simultaneously acquired HAU and eight other HAU affiliated 
corporations through the purchase of all outstanding stock. 
(R. 42, 1 11; R. 250, Respondent's Ex. 6.) The shareholders 
of HAU at the time of the 1998 Champion purchase consisted 
of Eugene Whitworth ("Whitworth") who owned 60%, Mandell who 
owned 20%, and Gerald Myer who owned the remaining 20%. (R. 
250, Respondent's Ex. 6, p.48, Ex. 1.1.1.) Whitworth also 
held 100% or controlling ownership in the eight other 
corporations acquired by Champion. 
Champion negotiated solely with Whitworth for the 
purchase of HAU and the other eight corporations. Champion 
7 
required, as a condition of the purchase, that all 
corporations be part of the transaction. (R. 42, § 13; R. 
250, Respondent's Ex. 5, p.5.) Champion and Whitworth 
agreed on a lump sum price for HAU and the eight other 
corporations of $102.5 million. (R. 42, f 13; R. 250, 
Respondent's Ex. 5, p.5.) Of this amount, $67.5 million was 
to be paid in cash upon closing and $5 million held in 
escrow for 18 months for unknown liabilities. The balance 
of $30 million was contingent upon the future combined 
earnings of HAU and the other eight corporations reaching 
certain levels. (R. 42, i 15; R. 250, Respondent's Ex. 5, 
p.5, Ex. 6, 1 2.1.3. ) 
Champion left it to the discretion of Whitworth to 
allocate the purchase price between HAU and the other eight 
corporations. (R. 250, Respondent's Ex. 5, p.5.) Whitworth 
directed that $8,105 million of the total $102.5 million 
purchase price be allocated to HAU. (R. 43, 19; R. 250, 
Respondent's Ex. 5, p.6, Ins. 4-10.) Whitworth further 
directed that only 38% of the purchase price allocated to 
HAU be paid in cash upon closing ($3,105 million of the 
$8,105 million allocated HAU), with the balance to be paid 
upon satisfaction of future contingencies. (R.43 5 20; R. 
8 
250, Respondent's Ex. 5 & 6.) The 38% cash allocation to 
HAU was significantly lower that the 70% cash allocation 
contained in the total Champion purchase price. (R. 250, 
Respondent's Ex. 4, 1 20.) As a 20% shareholder, Mandell 
was to ultimately receive $1,621,000 under Whitworth's 
allocation, assuming all of the contingencies were 
satisfied. (R. 43, f 21; R. 250, Respondent's Ex. 6.) 
Payment to Mandell from the HAU sale. 
Based upon this allocation, the nine corporations were 
sold concurrently to Champion, on March 27, 1998, for the 
total purchase price described above. On this date, Mandell, 
a Utah resident, (R. 41, fl 5) executed a Stock Purchase 
Agreement and received $621,000, representing his 20% stock 
interest in the $3,105 million cash portion allocated to 
HAU. (R. 43, S( 22; R.250, Respondent's Ex. 6, "Purchase 
Agreement.") The contingencies for the deferred payment 
were never satisfied, so the deferred payment of $30 million 
was never paid by Champion. As a result, Mandell realized 
no other income from the sale other than the settlement 
proceeds received in 2001. 
9 
338(h) (10) Deemed Asset Sale Election. 
Mandell and the shareholders in the nine corporations 
elected under 26 U.S.C § 338(h)(10) that the Champion 
acquisitions be deemed a sale of the corporations' assets 
and a subsequent liquidation of the sale proceeds to the 
shareholders. (R. 44, Jfl 23, 24; R. 250, Respondent's Ex. 
8.) At the time of the sale, HAU was a subchapter S 
corporation for federal and state tax purposes. (R. 41, f 
6; R. 250, Respondent's Ex. 6.) Because of the 338(h) (10) 
election, the assets of HAU were deemed to be sold to 
Champion, the gain recognized by HAU on the deemed sale was 
passed through to the shareholders in proportion to their 
interest, and the assets received a stepped-up tax basis 
equal to the purchase price. (R. 44, 5 25; R. 250, 
Respondent's Ex. 7.) 
HAU reported in 1998 on its Utah income tax return that 
its commercial domicile was Utah and that 100% of its 
business income, consisting primarily of the gain from the 
deemed asset sale, should be apportioned to Utah during 
1998. (R. 44, 1 26; R. 250, Respondent's Ex. 7, p. 2 and 3.) 
10 
Misallocation of the Purchase Price. 
Subsequent to the sale in 1998, Mandell learned that 
Whitworth may not have allocated fairly the purchase price 
paid by Champion for the nine corporations. Mandell 
believed that Whitworth had not obtained an independent 
valuation of the nine corporations and that he had 
arbitrarily allocated more of the cash portion of the 
purchase price to corporations in which he held 100% 
ownership. According to Mandell, this arbitrary allocation 
harmed him because he received less than he should have from 
the deemed asset sale of HAU to Champion. (R. 44, 1 31; R. 
250, Respondent's Ex. 4.) 
Mandell Sues Whitworth. 
In 2000, Mandell filed a Complaint in the Second 
Judicial District Court of the State of Nevada against the 
Estate of Whitworth et al. (Whitworth had died on November 
23, 1998). (Addendum B, "Complaint"; R. 250, Respondent's 
Ex. 5.) Mandell alleged the following in the Complaint: 
"[Mandell" [has] discovered that the allocations of the 
purchase price fixed by Whitworth for each corporation 
were not based upon the actual values of each 
corporation compared to the total purchase price 
offered by Champion Homes Center, Inc. Instead, 
Whitworth's allocations inflated the values of those 
companies that he exclusively owned or where he had a 
large percentage of ownership. These allocations 
11 
decreased the true value of [Mandell's] ownership in 
[HAU]. 
(See Addendum B; R. 250, Respondent's Ex.4, 1 19.) 
The Complaint further alleged, 
Whitworth also allocated a substantially larger 
percentage of the cash portion of the purchase price to 
himself as compared to the cash paid to [Mandell] . 
[Mandell was] left relying upon achieving the uncertain 
performance criteria for the bulk of [his] allocated 
purchase price. On information and belief, Whitworth 
has transferred and assigned to the Gene Whitworth 
Trust payments of money, effects and other valuable 
things, received by Whitworth as a result of his 
disproportionate allocation of the purchase price and 
cash payments to the Homes America Sale. 
(See Addendum B; R. 250, Respondent's Ex. 4, II 20 and 21.) 
Mandell's Complaint sought as relief a constructive 
trust upon the portion of the purchase price received by 
Whitworth because of this improper allocation. (R. 45, I 
34; R. 250, Respondent's Ex. 4, p.9.) The Complaint also 
sought general damages. (R. 250, Respondent's Ex. 4, p.11.) 
Mandell settled this lawsuit in 2001. At that date, 
Mandell was no longer a Utah resident. The settlement 
released and discharged the claims made in the Complaint. 
(R. 45, I 35; R 250, Respondent's Ex. 3.) Mandell reported 
a capital gain from the settlement on his 2001 federal 
income tax return. Mandell's accountant, who prepared his 
2001 federal income tax return, justified the capital gain 
12 
treatment for the settlement proceeds because the proceeds 
were related to the sale of Mandell's stock of HAU in 1998. 
(R. 253 at 63-67). The accountant further stated that had 
the settlement related instead to general damages, the 
proceeds would have been reported either as ordinary income 
or as exempt. (R. 250 at 67.) 
Mandell did not file a 2001 Utah income tax return to 
report the settlement proceeds of $1,127,977.00. (R. 41, 1 
2.) 
The Estate of Whitworth also considered the settlement 
proceeds to relate to the purchase price of the HAU deemed 
asset sale to Champion. (R. 43, M 41 and 42; R. 253, p. 
118 - 122.) The Estate of Whitworth requested a claim of 
right credit on its 2001 federal income tax return. (Id.; 
R. 250, Respondent's Ex. 9). The credit represented the 
federal tax paid by Whitworth in 1998 as a result of the 
deemed asset sale on the portion of the purchase price 
received by Whitworth and then paid to Mandell under the 
settlement agreement. (id.) The Estate of Whitworth sought 
a similar adjustment as it related to Whitworth's Utah 
income tax liability and his claim was settled by the 
Commission. (id.; R. 253, p. 121, 122.) 
13 
Tax Commission n^cision. 
Based upon the foregoinq fart-q fha n 
y g I a c t s
' the Commission made the 
factual finding 
the that the damages sought by the Mandells in 1 Complaint and the related Motion for Summary 
Judgment were based upon the fact that Whitworth 
had received money from Champion that should have 
been paid to Mandell arising from Champion's 
purchase of the HAU and other eight companies 
stock. 
(Addendum C, "Tax Commission Decision," p.9.) The 
Commission concluded the settlement "proceeds are in lieu of 
the funds Mr. Mandell should have received at the time . . . 
he sold the stock in [HAU]. . . ." (Addendum C, p.8.) 
Because the proceeds related to what Mandell should 
have received from his sale of the stock, the Commission 
concluded that the proceeds were Utah source income and 
subject to Utah income tax. The Commission determined that 
Mandell had a Utah income tax liability for the tax year 
2001 of $70,129.62. (Addendum C.) 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The ultimate issue in this case is whether the 
settlement proceeds received by Mandell in 2001 constitute 
taxable Utah source income. 
The first step in determining whether the settlement 
14 
proceeds constitute Utah source income is to determine their 
character and nature. The Commission applied the "in lieu 
of the damages test" to determine the character and nature 
of the settlement proceeds. In applying this test, the 
Commission made the factual finding that the damages sought 
in Mandell's Complaint related to the funds Mandell should 
have received in 1998 when he sold his stock in HAU. 
Mandell questions this finding of fact, but fails to 
to marshal the evidence supporting the finding. Because 
Mandell has failed to marshal the evidence, the Court should 
sustain the Commission's finding. In any event, the 
Commission's finding is supported by substantial evidence. 
Assuming this Court sustains the Commission's finding 
of fact on the character and nature of the settlement 
proceeds, the second step becomes whether these settlement 
proceeds constitute Utah source income. Mandell and the 
selling shareholders made an 26 U.S.C. § 338(h)(10) election 
as a condition of the sale. Because of this election, HAU 
recognized gain as if it sold assets to Champion for the 
purchase price. The tax character of this gain is 
determined in the hands of HAU and retains its character 
after it is passed through to the shareholders, including 
15 
Mandell, as Utah source income. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE COMMISSION CORRECTLY DETERMINED THE CHARACTER 
AND NATURE OF THE SETTLEMENT PROCEEDS BY APPLYING 
THE "IN LIEU OF THE DAMAGES TEST." 
Mandell was not a resident of Utah at the time he 
received the settlement proceeds in 2001. As a nonresident, 
Mandell's receipt of the settlement proceeds is subject to 
Utah income tax if the proceeds are from Utah sources and 
included in Mandell's federal adjusted gross income. Utah 
Code Ann. § 59-10-116 (2000).3 
Utah "state taxable income" is primarily determined by 
federal taxable income whether the person is a resident or 
nonresident. Utah Code Ann. § 59-10-112 (2000). As a 
result, federal tax law significantly impacts the 
determination of Mandell's state income tax liability. See 
Utah Code Ann. § 59-10-102(3) (2000). 
Mandell included the settlement proceeds on his 2001 
federal income tax return. Since Mandell was a Utah 
3
 The calculation of Utah income tax on Utah source 
income of a nonresident is made by determining the state tax 
liability of the nonresident in the same manner as a 
resident and then apportioning that liability to Utah based 
upon a ratio of Utah source income to the nonresident's 
total federal adjusted gross income. Utah Code Ann. § 59-
10-116 (2000) . 
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nonresident in 2001, the Commission must determine whether 
the settlement proceeds included in Mandell's federal 
adjusted gross income constitute Utah source income. This 
requires the Commission to determine the character and 
nature of the settlement proceeds for tax purposes.4 
This determination is critical to this case. Most of 
Mandell's arguments, including his Constitutional arguments, 
hinge on his conclusion that the settlement proceeds relate 
to Whitworth's "separate fraud transaction" and not the 
deemed asset sale as found by the Commission. 
The Commission determined the character and nature of 
the settlement proceeds by applying the test "in lieu of 
what were the damages awarded?" For purposes herein, this 
test is referred to as the "in lieu of the damages test." 
This test is established in both federal and state tax law. 
See Alexander v. IRS, 72 F.3d 938, 942 (1st Cir. 1995); 
Raytheon Production Corp. v. Commissioner, 144 F.2d 110, 113 
(1st Cir. 1944), and Pennzoil Co. v. Department of Revenue, 
33 P.3d 314, 317 (Ore. 2001) (all applying the "in lieu of 
4
 Mandell acknowledged in his opening brief that the 
Commission correctly decided that it must first determine 
the character and nature of the settlement proceeds. 
Appellant's Br. at 21-23. 
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the damages test"); Hort v. Commission, 33 U.S. 28 (1941) 
(applying similar reasoning). 
The Oregon Supreme Court in Pennzoil, 33 P.3d 314, 
applied the "in lieu of the damages test" to determine the 
nature of settlement proceeds for state income tax purposes. 
There, Pennzoil was seeking damages against Texaco resulting 
from Texaco7s tortiuous interference with Pennzoil's 
contract with Getty Oil. id. at 315. The Oregon Supreme 
Court concluded that "Pennzoil received the settlement 
proceeds in lieu of its agreement with Getty and that the 
agreement gave rise to the disputed income." Xd. at 317. 
Mandell's determination of the character and nature of 
the settlement proceeds focuses only on his legal claims to 
establish liability and not the basis for the damages. 
However, the "in lieu of the damages test" requires an 
analysis of the damages sought in the complaint and what 
they replaced. See Pennzoil, 33 P.3d at 317. 
The Commission applied the proper legal standard in 
determining the nature and character of the settlement 
proceeds. 
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II. MANDELL HAS FAILED TO MARSHAL EVIDENCE SUPPORTING 
THE COMMISSION'S FACTUAL FINDING ON THE CHARACTER 
AND NATURE OF THE SETTLEMENT PROCEEDS, AND EVEN IF 
THE MARSHALING REQUIREMENT IS SATISFIED, THE 
COMMISSION'S FINDING IS SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL 
EVIDENCE. 
A. The Commission's finding as to the character 
and nature of the settlement proceeds is a 
finding of fact. 
The determination of the character and nature of the 
settlement proceeds by applying the "in lieu of the damages 
test" is a finding of fact. See Alexander v. Internal 
Revenue Service, 72 F.3d 938, 944 (1st Cir. 1995). The 
Commission determined the nature and character of the 
settlement proceeds by finding 
that the damages sought in the Mandells' Complaint 
and related Motion for Summary Judgment were based 
upon the fact that Whitworth had received money 
from Champion that should have been paid to 
Mandell arising from Champion's purchase of the 
HAU and other eight entities stock. 
(Addendum B, Tax Commission's Final Decision, p. 9.). The 
Commission concluded that the settlement "proceeds are in 
lieu of the funds Mr. Mandell should have received at the 
time . . . he sold the stock in [HAU]. . . . " (Addendum B, 
p.8.)5 
5
 This finding is part of the "Conclusion of Law" 
section of the Commission's Decision, but is a factual 
conclusion and is treated as such here. 
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The Commission's findings of fact are given deference, 
and the reviewing Court must apply the substantial evidence 
standard. Utah Code Ann. § 59-1-610 (1) (a) (West 2004). 
"Substantial evidenced" is that quantum and quality of 
relevant evidence that is adequate to convince a reasonable 
mind to support a conclusion." See First National Bank of 
Boston v. County Bd. of Equalization of Salt Lake County, 
799 P.2d 1163, 1165 (Utah 1992). Substantial evidence is 
"more than a mere 'scintilla' of evidence . . . though 
'something less than the weight of the evidence.'" Grace 
Drilling v. Board of Review, 776 P.2d 63, 68 (Utah App. 
1989) (citations omitted). 
B. Mandel has failed to marshal the evidence to 
contest the Commission's factual finding on 
the character and nature of the settlement 
proceeds. 
Rule 24(a)(9) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure 
requires "[a] party challenging a fact [to] first marshal 
all record evidence that supports the challenged finding." 
The Utah Supreme Court has held that "to pass this 
threshold, parties protesting findings of fact must 'marshal 
all the evidence in support of the finding and then 
demonstrate that the evidence is legally insufficient to 
support the finding even when viewing it in a light most 
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favorable to the court below.'' United Park City Mines Co. 
v. Stichtina Mayflower Mountain Fonds, 2006 UT 35, 1 24, 140 
P.3d 1200, quoting State v. Clark, 2005 UT 75, 117, 124 P.3d 
235. Failure to satisfy the marshaling requirement permits 
this Court to rely upon the Commission's findings of fact. 
United Park City Mines, 2006 UT 35, SI 27. 
Mandell questions the Commission's finding that the 
settlement "proceeds are paid in lieu of the funds Mr. 
Mandell should have received at the time . . . he sold the 
stock of [HAU]. . . . " Br. Applt. at 22-24. Mandell 
asserts evidence that supports his argument, but fails to 
marshal the evidence that supports the Commission's finding. 
Instead Mandell merely recites the factual conclusions of 
the Commission in his Statement of Facts. As a result, the 
Court should sustain the Commission's factual finding on the 
character and nature of the settlement proceeds. 
C. The Commission's finding that the settlement 
"proceeds were in lieu of the funds Mr. 
Mandell should have received at the time . . . 
he sold the stock of [HAU]. . . ."is 
supported by substantial evidence. 
Even if the marshaling requirement were satisfied, 
there is substantial evidence to support the Commission's 
factual conclusion that the ''proceeds are in lieu of the 
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funds Mr. Mandell should have received . . . at the time he 
sold the stock of [HAU] . . . ." (Addendum C, "Commission's 
Final Decision," p. 8.) The primary basis for damages under 
the lawsuit was that Mandell failed to receive the value of 
his HAU stock sold to Champion in the deemed asset sale 
because of Whitworth's misallocation of the purchase price. 
(Complaint, Addendum B.) Mandell's damages exist solely 
because he did not receive what he should have received 
absent Whitworth's alleged misallocation. (id.) Had there 
been no sale, there would have been no damages. 
Mandell's complaint expressly sought as relief a 
constructive trust on the sale price misallocated by 
Whitworth. (Id.) Mandell acknowledged that the settlement 
proceeds related to the sale of his interest in HAU by 
reporting the settlement proceeds as a capital gain, not as 
ordinary income, on his 2001 federal income tax return and 
by specifically identifying the gain as relating to the sale 
of his interest in HAU. (R. 250, Respondent's Ex. 2. P. 7.) 
His accountant, who prepared the return, justified the 
capital gain treatment on the basis that it related to 
Mandell's sale of his stock under the deemed asset sale 
agreement. Mandell's accountant represented that the 
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settlement proceeds would not have received capital gain 
treatment had they related to something other than the sale 
of Mandell's interest in HAU. (R. 253, p. 61-67.) 
The Estate of Whitworth, which paid the settlement 
proceeds, also considered the proceeds to relate to the HAU 
deemed asset sale to Champion. (R. 250, Respondent's Ex. 
9.) For this reason, the Estate of Whitworth sought a "claim 
of right credit" on its 2001 federal income tax return for 
the income taxes paid by Whitworth on the portion of the 
purchase price Champion paid to him which was subsequently 
paid to Mandell as settlement proceeds. See 26 U.C.S. § 
1341. A similar equitable adjustment was sought by 
Whitworth for his Utah income tax liability. Mandell 
discounts this fact by arguing that Whitworth may not have 
been entitled to a federal claim of right deduction because 
of his fraud. See Kraft v. United States, 991 F.2d 292 (6th 
Cir. 1993). However, whether or not Whitworth was legally 
entitled to a claim of right has no relevance.6 The 
6
 There is no evidence before the Court on whether the 
Internal Revenue Service denied the claim of right credit 
sought by the Estate of Whitworth. Moreover, as Kraft 
pointed out, there are other ways to deduct embezzled funds 
besides a claim of right, such as 26 U.S.C. § 165(c)(2). 
Kraft, 991 F.2d at 298. The Commission settled Whitworth's 
state claim. 
23 
relevant point is that the Estate of Whitworth also 
concluded that the settlement proceeds pertained to the 
deemed asset sale. This is important because the character 
of the settlement proceeds should be the same for both 
parties to the settlement. The Estate of Whitworth's 
understanding, as a party to the settlement, supports the 
Commission's finding. 
The fact that the settlement proceeds were paid as a 
result of litigation against Whitworth and not Champion does 
not alter their character. The Oregon Tax Court in Pennzoil 
v. Department of Rev., 15 Or. Tax 101 (Or. Tax Reg. Div. 
2000), held that it did not matter that the lawsuit and 
settlement proceeds pertained to Texaco, not Getty who was a 
party subject to the contract. The Oregon Tax Court 
concluded, 
[i]t is the same as if Pennzoil said to Texaco: 
you stole our deal, pay us what we would have 
benefitted. In the court's view, it does not 
matter whether the contract was sold, stolen, 
condemned or interfered with or cancelled, the 
income realized from it was income "arising from" 
that contract. 
Id. at 109. Similarly, here the settlement proceeds 
reflected the amount Mandell would have received under the 
deemed asset sale of HAU to Champion had Whitworth not 
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misallocated the purchase price. 
Substantial evidence supports the Commission's finding 
that the settlement "proceeds are in lieu of the funds Mr. 
Mandell should have received at the time . . . he sold the 
stock of HAU. . . ." 
III. THE SETTLEMENT PROCEEDS ARE UTAH SOURCE INCOME. 
A. The Commission correctly found that the 
settlement proceeds constitute Utah source 
income. 
Once it is determined that the character and nature of 
the settlement proceeds relate to the deemed asset sale, the 
next question is whether the proceeds constitute Utah source 
income. This determination hinges on the corporate tax 
status of HAU and the 26 U.S.C. § 338(h) (10) election made 
by Mandell. 
Utah source income is income that is "attributable to 
or resulting from the ownership in this state of any 
interest in real or tangible personal property; or the 
carrying on of a business, trade, profession, or occupation 
in this state." Utah Code Ann. § 59-10-117 (1) (2000) . A 
nonresident having Utah source income is subject to Utah 
income tax on that income. Utah Code Ann. § 59-10-116 
(2000). 
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HAU, at the time of the Champion acquisition, was taxed 
as a "subchapter S corporation" for federal income tax 
purposes. See 26 U.S.C. § 1361 (defining a subchapter S 
corporation) . The income of an S corporation is not subject 
to federal income tax at the corporate level; rather, the 
income is passed through and taxed to the shareholders based 
upon their proportionate ownership. 26 U.S.C. §§ 1363, 
1366. This federal tax treatment differs from a non S 
corporation, usually termed a "C Corporation", where the 
income of the corporation is taxed at the corporate level 
and again at the shareholder level when dividends are 
issued. 26 U.S.C. §§ 1, 11(a), 61(a)(7). S corporations 
avoid this double tax effect by passing their income through 
to the shareholders, who are subject to federal tax on the 
income. The income passed through to the shareholders 
retains its character as held in the hands of the 
corporation. See 26 U.S.C. § 1366(b). Thus, if the income 
was Utah source income in hands of the S corporation, it 
retains that character in the hands of the shareholder, 
including non-resident shareholders. See Utah Code Ann. § 
59-7-702 (2000); id. § 59-10-117 (2) (d) (2000), and id. § 59-
10-118 (2000). 
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Utah law provides that, for state tax purposes, S 
corporations are taxed "in the same manner as taxed for 
federal purposes . . . ." Utah Code Ann. § 59-7-701 (2000). 
As a result, shareholders are subject to Utah income tax on 
income passed to them from the S corporation. Utah Code 
Ann. § 59-7-702 (2000). Nonresident shareholders are only 
taxable on the portion of the S corporation's income 
relating to Utah sources in accordance with Utah Code Ann. 
§§ 59-10-117 (2000) and Utah Code Ann. 59-10-118 (2000). 
As a condition of Champion's purchase, the shareholders 
of HAU and the other eight corporations elected under 26 
U.S.C. § 338(h)(10) (2001) to treat the stock sale to 
Champion in 1998 as a deemed asset sale for tax purposes. 
The result of this election is that HAU was deemed to have 
received a taxable gain from the sale of its assets to 
Champion. 26 U.S.C. § 338(a)(1). Since HAU was an S 
corporation, this gain and its tax characteristics in the 
hands of HAU were passed through to the shareholders, 
including Mandell, who were required to report the gain on 
their federal income tax returns in 1998. Because the § 
338(h)(10) election causes HAU to recognize the gain as if 
it sold its assets and pass this gain to Mandell and the 
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shareholders who report this gain on their individual income 
tax returns, the election does not require Mandell to 
recognized a gain or loss on the sale of his stock. 26 
U.S.C. § 338(h)(10)(A). Moreover, HAU's tax basis in its 
assets was stepped up to the purchase price because of the 
338(h) (10) election. 26 U.S.C. § 338(b)(1). This means 
that if these assets were subsequently resold at the 
purchase price, no gain would be recognized because of the 
step-up in basis. 
If the 338(h) (10) election had not been made, Mandell 
would have been taxed on the gain or loss of the sale of his 
stock interest and no gain would have been recognized by HAU 
and passed through to the shareholders. There would have 
been no stepped-up basis in the assets of HAU. If HAU then 
sold the assets at the purchase price, a gain would be 
realized by HAU and passed through to the shareholders. 
The 338(h) (10) election has critical importance in this 
case because, for tax purposes, the acquisition is treated 
as HAU having sold its assets to Champion and the gain 
therefrom is passed through and taxed to Mandell in 
proportion to his stock interest. The Utah source 
determination for the gain recognized by HAU and passed 
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through to Mandell is determined at the HAU level. See 26 
U.S.C. § 1366(b), Utah Code Ann. § 59-7-701; id. § 59-10-
117(2) (d) . 
In Mandell's case, the above principles of law apply as 
follows. Mandell and the other HAU shareholders signed an 
agreement in 1998 for the sale of their stock interest in 
HAU for the sum of $8,105 million. Mandel's share of this 
sum for his 20% stock interest was $1,621,000. Of this 
amount, only $621,000 was paid in 1998 to Mandell. HAU 
reported this sum as Utah source income in its 1998 federal 
income tax return and this amount was passed through to 
Mandell who was required to report this income on his 
federal and state income tax returns for 1998. No other 
payments under the sale were made until 2001 when Mandell 
received the additional sum of $1,127,977.00 in settlement 
proceeds. 
The fact that Mandell was a Utah resident in 1998 and a 
Utah non-resident in 2001 does not alter the character and 
nature of the settlement proceeds as Utah source income. 
The income from the sale, whether paid through the 
settlement or otherwise, was all Utah source income in the 
hands of HAU. HAU reported the original gain in 1998 as 
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business income and 100% was apportioned to Utah because it 
operations were entirely within Utah. See Utah Code Ann. § 
59-10-118(2) (2000) .7 Even if the gain had been considered 
non-business income, HAU's commercial domicile was Utah as 
reported on its 1998 income tax return and the gain would 
have been allocated to Utah as Utah source income. Utah 
Code Ann. § 59-10-118(5) (2000). The fact that the purchas 
price was misallocated does not alter this conclusion. The 
litigation simply corrected the allocation of proceeds that 
went to Whitworth instead of Mandell. 
Mandell argues that his state of residence at the time 
he received the settlement proceeds dictates the source of 
the income. This argument depends on the assumption that 
the settlement proceeds do not relate to the deemed asset 
sale. It also incorrectly assumes that the UDITPA 
provisions defining commercial domicile for purposes of the 
7
 Section 59-10-118 contains the UDITPA (Uniform 
Division of Income for Tax Purposes Act) provisions of the 
Multistate Tax Compact and can also be found in Utah Code 
Ann. § 59-1-801(Article IV)and Utah Code Ann. §§ 59-7-301 
through 321. These provisions are adopted by member states 
to prevent double taxation and to meet constitutional 
limitations on taxing a multistate taxpayer. HAU was not a 
multistate taxpayer since its business was conducted 
entirely in Utah and there was no need to allocate 
nonbusiness income or apportion business income to any othe 
state. 
30 
settlement proceeds relate to Mandell, not to the commercial 
domicile of HAU, which recognized the gain. Utah Code Ann. 
§ 59-10-118(2000). The character of the gain for source 
income purposes is determined at the HAU level, not 
Mandell's. Seje 26 U.S.C § 1366 (b) (2001) ; Utah Code Ann. § 
59-7-701(2000). 
Mandell contends the settlement proceeds should not be 
subject to the 338(h)(10) election because no separate 
election was made for these proceeds. This conclusion is in 
error. The 338(h) (10) election was applicable to Mandell's 
settlement proceeds initially paid to Whitworth under the 
original transaction and subsequently repaid to Mandell as 
settlement proceeds. Whether the settlement proceeds 
represent part of the payments to Whitworth under the HAU 
deemed asset sale or the deemed asset sales of the other 
eight corporations is irrelevant. All nine corporations and 
their shareholders elected 338(h)(10) treatment. (R. 250, 
Respondent's Ex. 8.) The settlement is just a reallocation 
between Mandell and Whitworth of the proceeds from the 
purchase price. The Court need only answer the question 
"How would the settlement proceeds have been taxed had they 
been correctly allocated and paid to Mandell in 1998 instead 
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of to Whitworth?" 
The Court can also reach this same conclusion by 
focusing only on the 338(h)(10) election for HAU. Mandell's 
original share of the purchase price was $1,621,000 and the 
HAU 338(h)(10) election applied to this amount. Mandell 
only received $621,000 of this amount in 1998, in part 
because of Whitworth's fraud by allocating a significant 
percentage of the contingent purchase price to Mandell. The 
total Champion purchase price was 70% cash and 30% based 
upon future contingencies that were never realized. In 
contrast, the $1,610,000 purchase price allocated to Mandell 
by Whitworth was only 38% cash. The $621,000 received in 
1998 and the and $1,127,977 received in 2001 from the 
settlement proceeds approximate the $1,621,000 originally 
allocated to Mandell under the purchase agreement which was 
subject to the HAU 338(h) (10) election. 
B. There is no due process, commerce, or 
privilege clause violation. 
Mandell asserts general constitutional challenges to 
the Commission's decision that the procceeds are Utah source 
income. Mandell's constitutional arguments appear 
unnecessary. These constitutional challenges seem to hinge 
on Mandell's assumption that the settlement proceeds were 
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not received in lieu of the sales proceeds Mandell was 
entitled to as a result of the deemed asset sale of HAU to 
Champion. As discussed in section I, this is a factual 
conclusion. Unless this factual conclusion is overturned, 
the Constitutional questions do not need to be addressed. 
Mandell contends that the Commission's decision 
violates the Constitution. Since the Commission reaches 
this conclusion by applying applicable statutes, Mandell 
appears to be making an as applied challenge. This Court has 
stated that "[t]he party attacking the constitutionality of 
a statute has the burden of affirmatively demonstrating that 
the statute is unconstitutional. Moreover, there is a strong 
presumption that tax statutes are constitutional." Kennecott 
Corp. v. State Tax Comm'n, 858 P.2d 1381, 1384 (Utah 1993) 
(footnotes omitted). 
1. Mandell has failed to establish that the 
Commission7 s decision discriminates 
against him in violation of the 
Privileges and Immunities Clause. 
The Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Fourth 
Amendment protects the "right of a citizen of any State to 
^remove to and carry on business in another without being 
subjected in property or person to taxes more onerous than 
the citizens of the latter State are subjected to.'" Lundinq 
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v. New York Tax Appeals Tribunal, 522 U.S. 287, 296 (1998), 
quoting Shaffer v. Carter 252 U.S. 37, 56 (1920) . 
Discrimination must be shown between nonresidents and 
residents in taxation before the Privileges and Immunities 
Clause becomes a question. id. Mandell has not identified 
any discrimination resulting from the Commission's decision. 
The Commission has imposed Utah income tax on Mandell's 
Utah source income represented by the settlement proceeds. 
A Utah resident would be subject to the same tax at the same 
rate on the same income. See Utah Code Ann. § 59-10-
104(2000) (imposing income tax on the "state taxable income" 
of residents); Utah Code Ann. § 59-10-112 (2000) (defining 
state taxable income as an individual's federal taxable 
income with certain modifications not relevant here). 
Mandell's tax obligation on the settlement proceeds is no 
more than that imposed upon Utah residents. No 
discrimination exists. There is no violation of the 
Privileges and Immunities clause. 
2. The Commission's decision does not 
violate the Due Process and Commerce 
Clauses. 
Mandell argues that the Commission's decision violates 
the Due Process clauses of the Fourth and Fourteenth 
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Amendments and the Commerce clause. These clauses prevent 
Utah from taxing "value earned outside of its borders." 
Asarco Inc. v. Idaho State Tax Commission, 458 U.S. 307, 315 
(1982) . 
The United States Supreme Court has held that "the 
taxpayer has the Mistinct burden of showing by clear and 
cogent evidence that [the state tax] results in 
extraterritorial values being taxed . . . ." Container 
Corporation of America v. Franchise Tax Board, 463 U.S. 159, 
164 (1983) (quoting Exxon Corp. v. Wisconsin Dept. Of 
Revenue, 447 U.S. 207, 221 (1980)). Mandell has failed to 
satisfy this burden and instead questions the Commission's 
factual finding that the settlement proceeds relate to the 
deemed asset sale. 
It is a requirement of "both the Due Process and 
Commerce clauses that there be 'some definite link, some 
minimum connection, between a state and the person, property 
or transaction it seeks to tax.'" Allied-Signal, Inc. v. 
Director, Division of Taxation, 504 U.S. 768, 777 (1992) 
(quoting Miller Brothers Co. v. Maryland, 347 U.S. 340, 344-
345 (1954)). While the Due Process and Commerce clauses 
both share the nexus requirement, a violation of the 
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Commerce clause will also exist if the tax is not fairly 
apportioned. Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 
274 (1977) . 
The United States Supreme Court has held that no 
violation of the Commerce clause exists if the tax: 1) is 
applied to an activity with a substantial nexus with the 
taxing state, 2) is fairly apportioned, 3) does not 
discriminate against interstate commerce and 4) is fairly 
related to the services provided by the State. Id. 
The Commission's factual finding satisfies the nexus 
requirement. The Commission has determined that the 
settlement proceeds relate to the deemed asset sale of HAU 
property to Champion. The S corporation status of HAU and 
the 338(h) (10) election require that the character of the 
proceeds from this sale be determined in the hands of the 
HAU, not Mandell. All of the gain received from the deemed 
asset sale was apportioned to Utah because all of HAU7s 
business activities occurred in Utah. 
The Commerce clause's additional requirements related 
to fair apportionment do not apply here because the gain is 
not subject to tax by multiple jurisdictions. The gain 
recognized by HAU is apportioned 100% to Utah because all of 
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HAU's operations were in Utah 
CONCLUSION 
The Commission's decision should be affirmed, 
DATED this /j day of February, 2007. 
TIMOTHY A. B( 'I  . BODILY 
Assistant Attorney General 
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ADDENDUM 
A 
INDIVIDUAL INCOME TAX ACT 59-10-117 
3 (2XD and (4), and made 
tes. — The references to the 
Code sections in Subsection 
be no longer applicable to 
ginning after December 1, 
dX3), allowing for deduction 
»unt of a lump sum distribu-
,ome, was replaced with sub-
lted to this subsection. Sec-
ning portions of lump sum 
L pension plans, as allowed 
S(dX3), as a deduction from 
deleted. 
- The Internal Revenue Code 
ighout the section, is Title 26 
Operation. — Laws 1996, 
,aws 1996, ch. 326, § 2 each 
has retrospective operation 
beginning on or after January 
S.S.), ch. 4, which amended 
19 provides: "Sections 59-7* 
-10-114, and 59-10-201 hav* 
ation for taxable years begin* 
anuary 1, 1996." 
.S. Taxation §§ 1097tol09fr 
(3) If the taxpayer receives, in any taxable year beginning on or after the 
effective date of this chapter, a distribution from an electing small business 
corporation, as defined by Section 1371(b) of the Internal Revenue Code, of a 
net share of the corporation's undistributed taxable income for a taxable year 
or years prior to the taxable year in which such distribution is made, the 
commission shall make such adjustment to state taxable income as will 
prevent escape from taxation by this state of such undistributed taxable 
income previously taxed to the taxpayer for federal income tax purposes but 
not for state income tax purposes. 
(4) The commission shall by rule prescribe for adjustments to state taxable 
income of the taxpayer in circumstances other than those specified by Subsec-
tions (1), (2), and (3) of this section where, solely by reason of the enactment of 
this chapter, the taxpayer would otherwise receive or have received a double 
tax benefit or suffer or have suffered a double tax detriment. Anything in this 
section or this chapter to the contrary notwithstanding, the commission may 
not make any adjustment pursuant to this section which will result in an 
increase or decrease of tax liability the amount of which is less than $25. 
History: L. 1973, ch. 147, § 14; C. 1953, 
59-14A-14; renumbered by L. 1987, ch. 2, 
I 176. 
Federal Law. — The federal Internal Rev-
enue Code, referred to in Subsection (1), is Title 
26 of the U.S. Code. Section 1371(b) of the code, 
referred to in Subsection (3), appeared as 26 
UJ3.C. § 1371(b); that section was omitted in 
i982. 
Compiler's Notes. — The references to 
"former Chapter 14" of this title in Subsection 
(2) apparently mean those provisions so num-
bered prior to the 1987 revision of this title. 
Cross-References. — Effective date of 
chapter, § 59-10-546. 
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A.L.R. — Decision to take foreign income 
Xnxes as federal credit under § 901 of the 
Internal Revenue Code (26 USCS § 901) as 
precluding their deduction for state income tax 
purposes, 77 A.L.R.4th 823. 
Federal income taxes: income forecast 
method of depreciation, 108 A.L.R. Fed. 748. 
59-10-116. Tax on nonresident individual's state taxable 
income. 
A tax is hereby imposed on the state taxable income, as defined in Sections 
|$-10-111 and 59-10-112, of every nonresident individual in accordance with 
lp schedules in Section 59-10-104, but the individual's Utah tax shall be only 
» portion of the resident tax so calculated as the individual's federal adjusted 
E>ss income received from Utah sources (determined under Section 59-10-
11) bears to the individual's total federal adjusted gross income for the same 
lable year. 
History: C. 1953,59-14A-15, enacted by L. 
U, ch. 206, § 2; renumbered by L. 1987, 
*A § 177. 
jhlO-117. Federal adjusted gross income derived from 
Utah sources. 
p) For the purpose of Section 59-10-116, federal adjusted gross income 
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History: L. 1973, ch. 147, § 16; 1986, ch. of the federal Internal Revenue Code, referred 
60, § 2; C. 1953, 59-14A-16; renumbered by to in the introductory language of Subsection 
L. 1987, ch. 2, § 178; 1995, ch. 311, § 13; (1) and in Subsection (lXa), see 26 U.S.C. §§ 62 
1995, ch. 345, § 3. and 613(c), respectively. 
Federal Law. — For Sections 62 and 613(c) 
59-10-118. Division of income for tax purposes. 
(1) As used in this section unless the context otherwise requires: 
(a) "Business income" means income arising from transactions and 
activity in the regular course of the taxpayer's trade or business and 
includes income from tangible and intangible property if the acquisition, 
management, and disposition of the property constitutes integral parts of 
the taxpayer's regular trade or business operations. 
(b) "Commercial domicile" means the principal place from which the 
trade or business of the taxpayer is directed or managed. 
(c) "Compensation" means wages, salaries, commissions, and any other 
form of remuneration paid to employee for personal services. 
(d) "Nonbusiness income" means all income other than business in-
come. 
(e) "Sales" means all gross receipts of the taxpayer not allocated under 
Subsections (3) through (7). 
(f) "State" means any state of the United States, the District of 
Columbia, the commonwealth of Puerto Rico, and any possession of the 
United States. 
(2) Any taxpayer having business income which is taxable both within and 
without this state, shall allocate and apportion his net income as provided in 
Biis section. 
(3) Rents and royalties from real or tangible personal property, capital 
gains, interest, dividends, or patent or copyright royalties, to the extent that 
Ihey constitute nonbusiness income, shall be allocated as provided in Subsec-
tions (4) through (7). 
(4) (a) Net rents and royalties from real property located in this state are 
allocable to this state. 
(b) Net rents and royalties from tangible personal property are allo-
cable to this state: 
(i) if and to the extent that the property is utilized in this state; or 
(ii) in their entirety if the taxpayer's commercial domicile is in this 
state and the taxpayer is not organized under the laws of or taxable in 
the state in which the property is utilized. 
(c) The extent of utilization of tangible personal property in a state is 
determined by multiplying the rents and royalties by a fraction, the 
numerator of which is the number of days of physical location of the 
property in the state during the rental or royalty period in the taxable year 
and the denominator of which is the number of days of physical location of 
the property everywhere during all rental or royalty periods in the taxable 
year. If the physical location of the property during the rental or royalty 
period is unknown or unascertainable by the taxpayer, tangible personal 
property is utilized in the state in which the property was located at the 
time the rental or royalty payer obtained possession. 
{6) (a) Capital gains and losses from sales of real property located in this 
state are allocable to this state. 
381 
59-10-118 REVENUE AND TAXATION 
(b) Capital gains and losses from sales of tangible personal property are 
allocable to this state if: 
(i) the property had a situs in this state at the time of the sale; or 
(ii) the taxpayer's commercial domicile is in this state and the 
taxpayer is not taxable in the state in which the property had a situs. 
(c) Capital gains and losses from sales of intangible personal property 
are allocable to this state if the taxpayer's commercial domicile is in this 
state. 
(6) Interest and dividends are allocable to this state if the taxpayer's 
commercial domicile is in this state. 
(7) (a) Patent and copyright royalties are allocable to this state: 
(i) if and to the extent that the patent or copyright is utilized by the 
payer in this state; or 
(ii) if and to the extent that the patent or copyright is utilized by 
the payer in a state in which the taxpayer is not taxable and the 
taxpayer's commercial domicile is in this state. 
(b) A patent is utilized in a state to the extent that it is employed in 
production, fabrication, manufacturing, or other processing in the state or 
to the extent that a patented product is produced in the state. If the basis 
of receipts from patent royalties does not permit allocation to states or if 
the accounting procedures do not reflect states of utilization, the patent is 
utilized in the state in which the taxpayer's commercial domicile is 
located. 
(8) All business income shall be apportioned to this state by multiplying the 
income by a fraction, the numerator of which is the property factor plus the 
payroll factor plus the sales factor, and the denominator of which is three. 
(9) The property factor is a fraction, the numerator of which is the average 
value of the taxpayer's real and tangible personal property owned or rented 
and used in this state during the tax period and the denominator of which is 
the average value of all the taxpayer's real and tangible personal property 
owned or rented and used during the tax period. 
(10) Property owned by the taxpayer is valued at its original cost. Property 
rented by the taxpayer is valued at eight times the net annual rental rate. Net 
annual rental rate is the annual rental rate paid by the taxpayer less any 
annual rental rate received by the taxpayer from subrentals. 
(11) The average value of property shall be determined by averaging the 
values at the beginning and ending of the tax period but the commission may 
require the averaging of monthly values during the tax period, if reasonably 
required to reflect properly the average value of the taxpayer's property. 
(12) The payroll factor is a fraction, the numerator of which is the total 
amount paid in this state during the tax period by the taxpayer for compen-
sation, and the denominator of which is the total compensation paid every-
where during the tax period. 
(13) Compensation is paid in this state if: 
(a) the individual's service is performed entirely within the state; or 
(b) the individual's service is performed both within and without the 
state, but the service performed without the state is incidental to the 
individual's service within the state; or 
(c) some of the service is performed in the state and: 
(i) the base of operations or, if there is no base of operations, the 
place from which the service is directed or controlled is in the state; or 
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(ii) the base of operations or the place from which the service is 
directed or controlled is not in any state in which some part of the 
service is performed, but the individual's residence is in this state. 
(14) The sales factor is a fraction, the numerator of which is the total sales 
of the taxpayer in this state during the tax period, and the denominator of 
which is the total sales of the taxpayer everywhere during the tax period. 
(15) Sales of tangible personal property are in this state if the property is 
delivered or shipped to a purchaser within this state regardless of the f.o.b. 
point or other conditions of the sale. 
(16) Sales, other than sales of tangible personal property, are in this state if: 
(a) the income-producing activity is performed in this state; or 
(b) the income-producing activity is performed both in and outside this 
state and a greater proportion of the income-producing activity is per-
formed in this state than in any other state, based on costs of performance. 
(17) If the allocation and apportionment provisions of this chapter do not 
fairly represent the extent of the taxpayer's business activity in this state, the 
taxpayer may petition for or the commission may require, in respect of all or 
any part of the taxpayer's business activity, if reasonable: 
(a) separate accounting; 
(b) the exclusion of any one or more of the factors; 
(c) the inclusion of one or more additional factors which will fairly 
represent the taxpayer's business activity in this state; or 
(d) the employment of any other method to effectuate an equitable 
allocation and apportionment of the taxpayer's income. 
History: L. 1973, ch. 147, § 17; C. 1953, 
59-14A-17; renumbered by L. 1987, ch. 2, 
§ 179; 1995, ch. 311, § 14. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 71 Am. Jur. 2d State and C.J.S. — 85 C.J.S. Taxation § 1103. 
Local Taxation § 576 et seq. 
59-10-119. Returns by husband and wife, either or both of 
whom is a nonresident. 
(1) If the federal taxable income of husband and wife (both nonresidents of 
this state) is reported or determined on separate federal returns, their state 
taxable incomes in this state shall be separately determined. 
(2) If the federal taxable income of husband and wife (both nonresidents) is 
reported or determined on a joint return their tax shall be reported or 
determined in this state on a joint return. 
(3) If either husband or wife is a nonresident and the other a resident, 
separate taxes shall be determined on their separate state taxable incomes on 
such forms as the commission shall prescribe, unless both elect to determine 
their state taxable income as if both were residents. If a husband and wife (one 
being a resident, the other a nonresident) file a joint federal income tax return, 
but determine their state taxable income separately, they shall compute their 
taxable incomes in this state as if their federal taxable incomes had been 
determined separately. 
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59-10-536. Limitations on assessment and collection. 
(1) Except as otherwise provided in this section, the amount of any tax 
imposed by this chapter shall be assessed within three years after the return 
was filed (whether or not such return was filed on or after the date prescribed), 
and no proceeding in court without assessment for the collection of such tax 
shall be begun after the expiration of such period. 
(2) For purposes of this section: 
(a) A return of tax imposed by this chapter, except withholding tax, filed 
before the last day prescribed by statute or by rules promulgated pursuant 
to statute for the filing thereof, shall be deemed to be filed on such last day. 
(b) If a return of withholding tax for any period ending with or within 
a calendar year is filed before April 15 of the succeeding calendar year, 
such return shall be deemed to be filed on April 15 of such succeeding 
calendar year. 
(3) The tax may be assessed at any time if: 
(a) no return is filed; 
(b) a false or fraudulent return is filed with intent to evade tax; or 
(c) a return for the taxpayer is prepared by the commission in accor-
dance with Section 59-10-506. 
(4) If, before the expiration of the time prescribed in this section for the 
assessment of tax, both the commission and the taxpayer have consented in 
writing to its assessment after such time, the tax may be assessed at any time 
prior to the expiration of the period agreed upon. The period so agreed upon 
may be extended by subsequent agreements in writing made before the 
expiration of the period previously agreed upon. 
(5) (a) If a change is made in a taxpayer's net income on his or her federal 
income tax return, either because the taxpayer has filed an amended 
return or because of an action by the federal government, the taxpayer 
must notify the commission within 90 days after the final determination of 
such change. The taxpayer shall file a copy of the amended federal return 
and an amended state return which conforms to the changes on the federal 
return. No notification is required of changes in the taxpayer's federal 
income tax return which do not affect state tax liability. 
(b) The commission may assess any deficiency in state income taxes 
within three years after such report or amended return was filed. The 
amount of such assessment of tax shall not exceed the amount of the 
increase in Utah tax attributable to such federal change or correction. The 
provisions of this Subsection (b) do not affect the time within which or the 
amount for which an assessment may otherwise be made. However, if the 
taxpayer fails to report to the commission the correction specified in this 
Subsection (b) the assessment may be made at any time within six years 
after the date of said correction. 
(6) If a deficiency in federal income tax required to be reported is attribut-
able to the application to the taxpayer of a net operating loss carryback within 
the meaning of Section 6501(h) of the Internal Revenue Code, the correspond-
ing deficiency in the tax imposed by this chapter may be assessed at any time 
before the expiration of the period within which a deficiency for the taxable 
year of the net operating loss giving rise to the carryback may be assessed. 
(7) An erroneous refund shall be considered an underpayment of tax on the 
date made, and an assessment of a deficiency arising out of an erroneous 
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refund may be made at any time within three years from the time the refund 
was made, except that the assessment may be made within five years from the 
time the refund was made if it appears that any part of the refund was induced 
by fraud or misrepresentation of a material fact. 
(8) If a return is required for a decedent or for his estate during the period 
of administration, the tax shall be assessed within 18 months after written 
request therefor (made after the return is filed) by the executor, administrator, 
or other person representing the estate of such decedent, but not more than 
three years after the time the return was filed, except as otherwise provided in 
Subsections (3) through (9). 
(9) The amount of any tax imposed by this chapter may be assessed at any 
time within six years after the time the return was filed if: 
(a) a resident individual, estate, or trust omits from gross income as 
reported for federal income tax purposes an amount properly includable 
therein which is in excess of 25% of the amount of gross income stated in 
the return; or 
(b) a nonresident individual, estate, or trust omits from gross income as 
reported for federal income tax purposes an amount of adjusted gross 
income derived from Utah sources as defined by Section 59-10-117, 
properly includable therein, which is in excess of 25% of the amount of 
adjusted gross income derived from Utah sources which is reflected in such 
return. For the purposes of this Subsection (b) there may not be taken into 
account any amount which is omitted in the return if such amount is 
disclosed in the return, or in a statement attached to the return, in a 
manner adequate to apprise the commission of the nature and amount of 
such item. 
(10) The running of the period of limitations on assessments or collection of 
tax or other amount (or of a transferee's liability) shall, after the mailing of a 
notice of deficiency, be suspended for the period during which the commission 
is prohibited from making the assessment or from collecting by levy. 
History: L. 1973, ch. 147, § 86; 1979, ch. Federal Law. — For Section 6501(h) of the 
203 § 2-C 1953,59-14A-86; renumbered by federal Internal Revenue Code, cited in Subsec-
L. 1987,'ch. 2, § 244. tion (6), see 26 U.S.C. § 6501(h). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
C.J.S. — 85 C.J.S. Taxation § 1107. 
59-10-537. Interest on underpayment, nonpayment or ex-
tension of time for payment of tax. 
(1) If any amount of income tax is not paid on or before the last date 
prescribed in this chapter for payment, interest on such amount at the rate and 
in the manner prescribed in Section 59-1-402 shall be paid. Interest under this 
subsection may not be paid if the amount thereof is less than $1. If the time for 
filing of a return of tax withheld by an employer is extended, the employer 
shall pay interest for the period for which the extension is granted and may not 
charge such interest to the employee. 
(2) Where a deficiency or any interest or additional amounts assessed in 
connection therewith under Section 59-10-525 or under Subsection (1), or an 
addition to the tax in case of delinquency provided for in Section 59-10-539 is 
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Effective: October 23, 2004 
United States Code Annotated Currentness 
Title 26 Internal Revenue Code (Refs & Annos) 
Subtitle A Income Taxes (Refs & Annos) 
Chapter 1 Normal Taxes and Surtaxes (Refs & Annos) 
Subchapter C Corporate Distnbutions and Adjustments (Refs & Annos) 
^ Part II Corpoiate Liquidations (Refs & Annos) 
*J Subpart B Effects on Corporation 
-•§ 338. Certain stock purchases treated as asset acquisitions 
(a) General rule.--For puiposes of this subtitle, if a puichasing corpoiation makes an election under this section 
(oi is tieated undei subsection (e) as haung made such an election), then, in the case of any qualified stock 
purchase the taiget corporation-
(1) shall be tieated as haung sold all of its assets at the close of the acquisition date at fan maiket value in a 
single tiansaction and 
(2) shall be tieated as a new corpoiation which puichased all of the assets leieiied to m paragraph (1) as of the 
beginning of the day aftei the acquisition date 
(b) Basis oi assets after deemed purchase.— 
(1) In general.--Foi purposes of subsection (a), the assets of the target corporation shall be treated as puichased 
toi an amount equal to the sum of~ 
(A) the giossed-up basis of the puichasing corpoiation's recently purchased stock, and 
(B) the basis of the purchasing corpoiation's nomecently purchased stock 
(2) Adjustment for liabilities and other relevant items.-The amount descnbed in paragraph (1) shall be 
adjusted under regulations piescribed by the Secietaiy for liabilities of the target corporation and other relevant 
items 
(3) Election to step-up the basis of certain target stock.— 
(A) In general.-Under regulations prescribed by the Secietary, the basis of the puichasing corporation's 
nomecently purchased stock shall be the basis amount determined under subparagraph (B) of this paragraph if 
the puichasing corporation makes an election to recognize gam as if such stock weie sold on the acquisition 
date foi an amount equal to the basis amount determined under subparagraph (B) 
(B) Determination of basis amount.-Foi puiposes of subparagiaph (A), the basis amount determined under 
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this subpaiagiaph shall be an amount equal to the grossed-up basis determined under subparagiaph (A) of 
paragiaph (1) multiplied by a fiaction--
(i) the numeiator of which is the peicentage of stock (by value) in the taiget coipoiation attubutable to the 
puichasing corpoiation's nonrecently puichased stock, and 
(ii) the denominator of which is 100 peicent minus the peicentage lefened to in clause (I) 
(4) Grossed-up basis.-For puiposes of paiagraph (1), the grossed-up basis shall be an amount equal to the basis 
of the corpoiation's lecently puichased stock, multiplied by a fraction-
(A) the numeratoi of which is 100 percent, minus the percentage of stock (by value) in the target coipoiation 
attubutable to the purchasing corporation's nonrecently purchased stock, and 
(B) the denominator of which is the peicentage of stock (by value) in the taiget corporation attubutable to the 
pui chasing corpoiation's recently purchased stock 
(5) Allocation among assets.-The amount determined undei paragiaphs (1) and (2) shall be allocated among 
the assets of the taiget corporation undei regulations piescnbed by the Secretary 
(6) Definitions of recently purchased stock and nonrecently purchased stock.-- Foi puiposes of this 
subsection-
(A) Recent]} purchased stock.-The teim "lecently puichased stock" means any stock in the taiget 
coipoiation which is held by the pui chasing corporation on the acquisition date and which was puichased by 
such coipoiation duimg the 12- month acquisition penod 
(B) Nonrecenth purchased stock.—The teim "nomecently puichased stock" means any stock in the taiget 
coipoiation which is held by the pui chasing corporation on the acquisition date and which is not lecently 
puichased stock 
[(c) Repealed. Pub L 99-514, Title VI, § 631(b)(2), Oct 22, 1986, 100 Stat 2272] 
(d) Purchasing corporation; target corporation; qualified stock purchase.— Foi puiposes of this section— 
(1) Purchasing corporation.-The term "purchasing coipoiation" means any corporation which makes a 
qualified stock purchase of stock of another corporation 
(2) Target corporation.-The term "taiget corporation" means any coipoiation the stock of which is acquired by 
another corporation in a qualified stock pui chase 
(3) Qualified stock purchase.-The term "qualified stock purchase" means any transaction or series of 
transactions in which stock (meeting the requnements of section 1504(a)(2)) of 1 corporation is acquired by 
another coipoiation by purchase during the 12-month acquisition period 
(e) Deemed election where purchasing corporation acquires asset of target corporation.— 
(1) In general.-A purchasing coipoiation shall be treated as having made an election under this section with 
respect to any taiget coipoiation if, at any time duimg the consistency penod, it acquires any asset of the target 
coipoiation (oi a target affiliate) 
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(2) Exceptions.-Paiagiaph (1) shall not apply with lespect to any acquisition by the puichasmg corporation if— 
(A) such acquisition is puisuant to a sale by the target coipoiation (oi the taiget affiliate) in the oidinaiy 
course of its trade oi business, 
(B) the basis of the pioperty acquned is determined wholly by lefeience to the adjusted basis of such piopeity 
m the hands of the peison from whom acquired, 
(C) such acquisition was befoie September 1, 1982, or 
(D) such acquisition is described in legulations piescnbed by the Secretary and meets such conditions as such 
regulations may provide 
(3) Anti-avoidance rule.-Whenevei necessary to carry out the purpose of this subsection and subsection (f), the 
Secietary may treat stock acquisitions which aie puisuant to a plan and which meet the requirements of section 
1504(a)(2) as qualified stock purchases 
(f) Consistency required for all stock acquisitions from same affiliated group.—If a purchasing coipoiation 
makes qualified stock purchases with lespect to the target coipoiation and 1 or more target affiliates during any 
consistency period, then (except as otherwise piovided in subsection (e))— 
(1) any election undei this section with respect to the first such purchase shall apply to each othei such puichase, 
and 
(2) no election may be made undei this section with lespect to the second or subsequent such puichase if such an 
election was not made with lespect to the first such pui chase 
(g) Election.--
(1) When made.-Except as otheiwise piovided in legulations, an election undei this section shall be made not 
later than the 15th day of the 9th month beginning after the month in which the acquisition date occuis 
(2) Manner.-An election b> the puichasmg coipoiation undei this section shall be made in such mannei as the 
Secietary shall by legulations piescnbe 
(3) Election irre>ocable.--An election by a purchasing corporation undei this section, once made, shall be 
irrevocable 
(h) Definitions and special rules.—For purposes of this section-
(1) 12-month acquisition period.-The term "12-month acquisition period" means the 12-month period 
beginning with the date of the first acquisition by purchase of stock included in a qualified stock purchase (or, if 
any of such stock was acquired in an acquisition which is a purchase by reason of subparagraph (C) of paragraph 
(3), the date on which the acquiring corporation is fust considered undei section 318(a) (other than paiagiaph (4) 
thereof) as owning stock owned by the coipoiation fiom which such acquisition was made) 
(2) Acquisition date.-The term "acquisition date" means, with lespect to any corporation, the first day on which 
there is a qualified stock purchase with respect to the stock of such corporation 
(3) Purchase.— 
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(A) In general.—The teim "purchase" means any acquisition of stock, but only if— 
(i) the basis of the stock in the hands of the puichasing corpoiation is not determined (I) in whole 01 in pait 
by lefeience to the adjusted basis of such stock m the hands of the peison fiom whom acquned, 01 (II) undei 
section 1014(a) (1 elating to piopeity acquned fiom a decedent), 
(ii) the stock is not acquned in an exchange to which section 351, 354, 355, or 356 applies and is not 
acquned in any othei tiansaction described m legulations in which the tiansferoi does not lecognize the 
entne amount of the gam oi loss leahzed on the transaction, and 
(iii) the stock is not acquned fiom a person the owneiship of whose stock would, under section 318(a) (othei 
than paiagaraph [FN1] (4) thereof), be attributed to the peison acqunmg such stock. 
(B) Deemed purchase under subsection (a).—The term "purchase" includes any deemed purchase undei 
subsection (a)(2) The acquisition date for a corporation which is deemed purchased under subsection (a)(2) 
shall be deteimmed under regulations piescnbed by the Secietaiy 
(C) Certain stock acquisitions from related corporations.— 
(i) In general.-Clause (in) of subparagraph (A) shall not apply to an acquisition of stock from a lelated 
corporation if at least 50 peicent in value of the stock of such i elated corporation was acquired by purchase 
(within the meaning of subpaiagraphs (A) and (B)) 
(ii) Certain distiibutions.—Clause (l) of subpaiagiaph (A) shall not apply to an acquisition of stock 
desciibed m clause (I) of this subpaiagiaph if the corpoiation acqunmg such stock— 
(I) made a qualified stock pin chase of stock of the l elated corpoiation and 
(II) made an election under this section (or is tieated under subsection (e) as having made such an 
election) with lespect to such qualified stock pui chase 
(iii) Related corporation defined.—Foi puiposes of this subparagiaph, a corpoiation is a ielated 
corpoiation if stock owned by such corpoiation is tieated (under section 318(a) other than paragiaph (4) 
thereof) as owned by the corpoiation acqunmg the stock 
(4) Consistency period.— 
(A) In general.-Except as piovided in subparagraph (B), the term "consistency penod" means the penod 
consisting of~ 
(i) the 1-year penod befoie the beginning of the 12-month acquisition penod for the target corpoiation, 
(ii) such acquisition period (up to and including the acquisition date), and 
(iii) the 1-yeai period beginning on the day after the acquisition date 
(B) Extension \>here there is plan.-The penod lefened to in subpaiagraph (A) shall also include any period 
during which the Secietaiy detei mines that there was in effect a plan to make a qualified stock pui chase plus 1 
or moie othei qualified stock pui chases (or asset acquisitions desciibed in subsection (e)) with lespect to the 
taiget corpoiation or any taiget affiliate 
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(5) Aiiiliated group.—The term "affiliated gioup" has the meaning given to such teim by section 1504(a) 
(deteimined without legaid to the exceptions contained in section 1504(b)) 
(6) Target aifiliate.-
(A) In general.—A coipoiation shall be treated as a target affiliate of the taiget coipoiation if each of such 
corpoiations was at any time during so much of the consistency penod as ends on the acquisition date of the 
target coipoiation, a membei of an affiliated gioup which had the same common paient 
(B) Certain ioreign corporations, etc.—Except as otherwise piovided in regulations (and subject to such 
conditions as may be piovided in legulations)-
(i) the term "taiget affiliate" does not include a foreign corporation, a DISC, or a coipoiation to which an 
election under section 936 applies, and 
(ii) stock held by a taiget affiliate m a foieign coipoiation oi a domestic corporation which is a DISC or 
described in section 1248(e) shall be excluded fiom the opeiation of this section 
|(7) Repealed. Pub L 100-647, Title I, § 1006(e)(20), Nov 10, 1988, 102 Stat 3403] 
(8) Acquisitions b} afiiliated group treated as made by 1 corporation.—Except as provided in regulations 
piescribed by the Secietaiy, stock and asset acquisitions made by members of the same affiliated gioup shall be 
tieated as made by 1 coipoiation 
(9) Target not treated as member oi aiiiliated group.-Except as otherwise piovided in paiagiaph (10) oi in 
legulations piesciibed undei this paiagiaph, the taiget coipoiation shall not be tieated as a membei of an 
affiliated gioup with respect to the sale descnbed in subsection (a)(1) 
(10) Elective recognition oi gain or loss by target corporation, together with nonrecognition oi gain or loss 
on stock sold by selling consolidated group.— 
(A) In general.-Undei legulations piesciibed by the Secretary, an election may be made under which if— 
(i) the target coipoiation was befoie the tiansaction, a member of the selling consolidated gioup, and 
(ii) the target coipoiation recognizes gain oi loss with lespect to the transaction as if it sold all of its assets in 
a single transaction, 
then the target coipoiation shall be tieated as a membei of the selling consolidated gioup with respect to 
such sale, and (to the extent piovided in legulations) no gain or loss will be recognized on stock sold or 
exchanged in the tiansaction by members of the selling consolidated gioup 
(B) Selling consolidated group.-For purposes of subparagraph (A), the term "selling consolidated group" 
means any group of corporations which (for the taxable period which includes the transaction)--
(i) includes the taiget coipoiation, and 
(ii) files a consolidated return 
To the extent piovided in legulations, such teim also includes any affiliated group of corpoiations which 
includes the taiget coipoiation (whether or not such gioup files a consolidated return) 
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(C) Information required to be furnished to the Secretary.—Undei legulations, wheie an election is made 
undei subpaiagiaph (A), the puichasing coipoiation and the common paient of the selling consolidated gioup 
shall, at such times and in such mannei as ma\ be pio\ided in legulations furnish to the Secietaiy the 
following mfoimation 
(i) The amount allocated undei subsection (b)(5) to goodwill 01 going concern value 
(ii) Any modification of the amount described in clause (1) 
(iii) Any othei information as the Secretary deems necessaiy to carry out the provisions of this paragiaph 
(11) Elective formula for determining fair market >alue.-Foi purposes of subsection (a)(1), fair maiket value 
may be determined on the basis of a foimula provided m legulations prescribed by the Secietary which takes into 
account liabilities and other relevant items 
[(12) Repealed. Pub L 99-514, Title VI, § 631(e)(5), Oct 22, 1986, 100 Stat 2273] 
(13) Tax on deemed sale not taken into account for estimated tax purposes.-For puiposes of section 6655, 
tax attnbutable to the sale descnbed m subsection (a)(1) shall not be taken into account The preceding sentence 
shall not apply with lespect to a qualified stock pui chase foi which an election is made under paiagraph (10) 
[(14) Repealed. Pub L 108-27, Title III, § 302(e)(4)(B)(i), May 28, 2003, 117 Stat 763] 
(15) Combined deemed sale return.-Undei regulations piescnbed by the Secietaiy, a combined deemed sale 
letuin may be filed by all taiget corpoiations acquned by a pui chasing coipoiation on the same acquisition date 
if such taiget corpoiations weie membeis of the same selling consolidated gioup (as defined in subpaiagiaph (B) 
of paiagraph (10)) 
(16) Coordination with foreign tax credit provisions.-Except as provided in legulations, this section shall not 
apply for puiposes of determining the source oi chaiactei of any item for puiposes of subpait A of pait III of 
subchapter N of this chaptei (lelating to foieign tax ciedit) The piecedmg sentence shall not apply to any gam 
to the extent such gain is includible m gioss income as a dividend undei section 1248 (deteimined without legaid 
to any deemed sale under this section by a foieign coipoiation) 
(i) Regulations.-The Secietary shall piescribe such legulations as may be necessary oi appropriate to cairy out the 
purposes of this section, including— 
(1) regulations to ensuie that the puipose of this section to lequire consistency of tieatment of stock and asset 
sales and puichases may not be circumvented through the use of any piovision of law or legulations (including 
the consolidated return legulations) and 
(2) regulations providing for the coordination of the provisions of this section with the piovision of this title 
relating to foieign corporations and their shareholders 
CREDIT(S) 
(Added Pub L 97-248, Title II, § 224(a), Sept 3, 1982, 96 Stat 485, and amended Pub L 97-448, Title III, § 
306(a)(8)(A)(i), Jan 12, 1983, 96 Stat 2402, Pub L 98-369, Div A, Title VII, § 712(k)(l) to (5)(D), (6), (7), July 
18, 1984, 98 Stat 948-952, Pub L 99-514, Title VI, § 631(b), (e)(5), Title XII, § 1275(c)(6), Title XVIII, §§ 
1804(e)(8)(A), 1899A(7), Oct 22, 1986, 100 Stat 2272, 2273, 2599, 2804, 2958, Pub L 100-647, Title I, §§ 
1006(e)(20), 1012(bb)(5)(A), 1018(d)(9), Nov 10, 1988, 102 Stat 3403, 3535, 3581, Pub L 101-508, Title XI, § 
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11323(c)(1) No\ 5, 1990, 104 Stat 1388-465 Pub L 108-27 Title III, § 302(e)(4)(B)(i), May 28, 2003, 117 
Stat 763 PubL 108-357, Title VIII § 839(a) Oct 22,2004 118 Stat 1597) 
[FN1] So m onginal Piobably should be "paiagiaph" 
TERMINATION OF AMENDMENTS 
<Foi piOMSions dnectmg that amendments by Title III of PubL 108-27 not apply to taxable yeais 
beginning aftei Decembei 31, 2008, see Sunset Piovision set out undei 26 U S C A § 1 > 
HISTORICAL AND STATUTORY NOTES 
Revision Notes and Legislative Reports 
1982 Acts Senate Report No 97-494, House Confeience Report No 97-760, and Statements by Legislative 
Leaders, see 1982 U S Code Cong and A dm News, p 781 
1983 Acts Senate Report No 97-592 and House Confeience Report No 97- 986, see 1982 U S Code Cong and 
Adm News, p 4149 
1984 Acts House Report No 98-432, House Conference Report No 98-861, Statements by Legislative Leaders, 
and Two Related Repoits see 1984 US Code Cong and Adm News, p 697 
1986 Acts House Confeience Report No 99-841 and Statement by Piesident, see 1986 US Code Cong and 
Adm News, p 407^ 
1988 Acts Senate Report No 100-445 and House Confeience Report No 100- 1104, see 1988 U S Code Cong 
and Adm News p 4515 
1990 Acts House Report No 101-881 and House Confeience Report No 101-964, see 1990 U S Code Cong and 
Adm News, p 2017 
2003 Acts House Conference Report No 108-126 and Statement by President, see 2003 US Code Cong and 
Adm News, p 730 
2004 Acts House Confeience Report No 108-755, see 2004 U S Code Cong and Adm News, p 1341 
Amendments 
2004 Amendments Subsec (h)(13) PubL 108-357, $ 839(a), at the end, added the following new sentence 
"The preceding sentence shall not apply with lespect to a qualified stock purchase for which an election is made 
under paragraph (10)" 
2003 Amendments Subsec (h)(14) PubL 108-27, § 302(e)(4)(B)(i) struck out par (14), which formerly read 
"(14) Coordination with section 341.—Foi purposes of deteimining whethei section 341 applies to a disposition 
withm 1 yeai aftei the acquisition date of stock by a shaieholder (other than the acquiring corporation) who held 
stock m the taiget corpoiation on the acquisition date, section 341 shall be applied without regaid to this section " 
1990 Amendments Subsec (h)(10)(C) PubL 101-508, § 11323(c)(1), added subpar (C) 
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1988 Amendments Subsec (e)(3) Pub L 100-647, § 1018(d)(9), substituted "which meet the lequnements of 
section 1504(a)(2)" foi "which meet the 80 percent lequnements of subpaiagiaphs (A) and (B) of subsection 
(d)(3)" 
Subsec (h)(7) Pub L 100-647, § 1006(e)(20) iepealed pai (7), which iead 
"(7) Additional percentage must be attiibutable to purchase, etc.-For purposes of subsection (c)(1), any 
inciease in the maximum peicentage of stock taken into account ovei the peicentage of stock (by value) of the 
target coipoiation held by the purchasing coipoiation on the acquisition date shall be taken into account only to the 
extent such inciease is attiibutable to~ 
"(A) purchase, or 
"(B) a redemption of stock of the target corporation— 
"(i) to which section 302(a) applies, oi 
"(ii) in the case of a shareholder who is not a coipoiation, to which section 301 applies " 
Subsec (h)(16) Pub L 100-647, § 1012(bb)(5)(A), added par (16) 
1986 Amendments Subsec (a)(1) Pub L 99-514, § 631(b)(1), struck out "to which section 337 applies" 
following "in a single transaction" 
Subsec (c) Pub L 99-514 § 631(b)(2), stiuck out subsec (c) lelating to special rules for the cooidination with 
section 337 wheie the puichasing coipoiation holds less than 100 peicent of the stock and in the case of ceitam 
ledemptions wheie an election is made undei this section 
Subsec (d)(3) Pub L 99-514, § 1804(e)(8)(A), substituted "(meeting the requuements of section lS04(a)(2)) of 1 
coipoiation is atquned by another coipoiation by puichase during the 12-month acquisition penod" foi "of 1 
corporation possessing (A) at least 80 percent of total combined voting powei of all classes of stock entitled to 
vote, and (B) at least 80 peicent of the total numbei of shaies of all other classes of stock (except nonvoting stock 
which is limited and pieferred as to dividends) is acquned by anothei coipoiation by puichase dunng the 
12-month acquisition penod" 
Subsec (h)(3)(C)(i) substituted "subpaiagraphs" foi "subpaiagiaph" (A) and (B) 
Subsec (h)(6)(B)(i) Pub L 99-514, § 1275(c)(6), struck out following "DISC," the phiase "a coipoiation 
descnbed m section 934(b)," 
Subsec (h)(10)(B) Pub L 99-514, § 631(b)(3), added piovision that to the extent piovided in legulations, the 
term "selling consolidated group" also includes any affiliated group of coiporations which includes the target 
corporation (whethei or not such group files a consolidated leturn) 
Subsec (h)(12) Pub L 99-514, § 631(e)(5), struck out pai (12) 1 elating to the applicability of section 337 where 
target had adopted a plan for complete liquidation 
1984 Amendments Subsec (a)(1) Pub L 98-369, § 712(k)(l)(A), inserted "at fair market value" following 
"acquisition date" 
Subsec (b) catchline Pub L 98-369, § 712(k)(l)(B) substituted "Basis of assets after deemed puichase" for 
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"Puce at which deemed sale made" 
Subsec (b)(1) Pub L 98-369, § 712(k)(l)(B), substituted in lntroductoiy text "as pui chased foi an amount equal 
to the sum of foi "as sold (and pui chased) at an amount equal to" subpai (A) "purchasing coipoiation's lecently 
pui chased stock and " for "pui chasing coipoiation's stock in the taiget coipoiation on the acquisition date", and 
subpar (B) "the basis of the pui chasing coipoiation's noniecently purchased stock" foi foimer pioMSion lelatmg to 
adjustment foi liabilities and other lelevant items, now coveied m par (2) 
Subsec (b)(2) Pub L 98-369, § 712(k)(l)(B), incorpoiated in pai (2) former par (1)(B) piovision, inserting pai 
catchhne "Adjustment for liabilities and othei lelevant items" and substituting "adjusted under legulations" foi 
"propeilv adjusted undei regulations" Foimer pai (2) ledesignated (4) 
Subsec (b)(3) Pub L 98-338, § 712(k)(l)(B), added par (3) Former par (3) ^designated (5) 
Subsec (b)(4) Pub L 98-369, § 712(k)(l)(B), ^designated foimei par (2) as (4), substituted in intioductory text 
"coipoiation's recently pui chased stock," foi "pui chasing coipoiation's stock in the taiget coipoiation on the 
acquisition date", inserted in subpar (A) "minus the peicentage of stock (by value) m the taiget coipoiation 
attributable to the purchasing corporation's nonrecently purchased stock", and substituted m subpar (B) "in the 
taiget coiporation attiibutable to the purchasing coipoiation's recently purchased stock" for "of the target 
coipoiation held by the pui chasing coipoiation on the acquisition date" 
Subsec (b)(5) Pub L 98-369, § 712(k)(l)(B), ^designated formei pai (3) as (5) and inserted leference to par 
(2) 
Subsec (b)(6) Pub L 98-369, § 712(k)(l)(B), added pai (6) 
Subsec (c)(1) Pub L 98-369 ^ 712(k)(2), inserted in last sentence following "such 1-yeai penod" the clause 
"and section 333 does not apply to such liquidation" 
Subsec (e)(2) Pub L 98-369, § 712(k)(3), substituted m subpai (B) "wholly" foi "(in whole or in part)", struck 
out subpar (D) piovision foi nonapphcation of par (1) to any acquisition by the puichasmg corporation if, to the 
extent provided in legulations, the pioperty acquned is located outside the United States, and redesignated as 
subpai (D) foimer (E) lequning theiem the acquisition to meet conditions provided m legulations 
Subsec (g)(1) Pub L 98-369, § 712(k)(4), substituted "the 15th day of the 9th month beginning aftei the month m 
which the acquisition date occurs" for "75 days after the acquisition date" 
Subsec (h)(1) Pub L 98-369, § 712(k)(5)(C), included within 12-month acquisition period the period beginning 
with the date on which the acquiring corporation is fust considered as owning stock owned by coiporation from 
which acquisition was made 
Subsec (h)(3)(A)(n) Pub L 98-369, § 712(k)(5)(D), included references to sections 354, 355, and 356 and m 
defining "puichase" provided that the stock be not acquired m any other transaction described m regulations m 
which the tiansferor does not lecognize the entire amount of the gain or loss realized on the transaction 
Subsec (h)(3)(B) Pub L 98-369, § 712(k)(5)(A), substituted in the catchhne "under subsection (a)" for "of stock 
of subsidiaries" and text leading "The term 'purchase' includes any deemed purchase under subsection (a)(2) The 
acquisition date for a coipoiation which is deemed pui chased under subsection (a)(2) shall be determined under 
regulations piesciibed by the Secretaiy" for "If stock in a coipoiation is acquned by puichase (withm the meaning 
of subpaiagiaph (A)) and, as a lesult of such acquisition, the coiporation making such purchase is tieated (by 
leason of section 318(a)) as owning stock in a 3rd coiporation, the coiporation making such puichase shall be 
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tieated as haung puichased such stock in such 3id corpoiation The corpoiation making such puichase shall be 
tieated as purchasing stock in the 3id corpoiation by leason of the preceding sentence on the fust day on which the 
pui chasing corpoiation is consideied undei section ^ 18(a) as owning such stock" 
Subsec (h)(3)(C) PubL 98-369, § 712(k)(S)(B), added subpai (C) 
Subsec (h)(7) Pub L 98-369, § 712(k)(6)(A), added par (7) and struck out formei pai (7) which had piovided 
that acquisitions by pui chasing corpoiation include acquisitions by corpoiations affiliated with purchasing 
corporation now co\ ered in subsec (h)(8) 
Subsec (h)(8) PubL 98-369, § 712(k)(6)(A), added par (8) lncorpoiatmg foimei par (7) piovision stating that 
"Except as otheiwise piovided m regulations, an acquisition of stock oi assets by any membei of an affiliated 
gioup which includes a puichasing corpoiation shall be treated as made by the purchasing corpoiation" Former 
pai (8) redesignated (9) 
Subsec (h)(9) PubL 98-369, § 712(k)(6)(A), (B), ledesignated foimer par (8) as (9) and substituted theiem 
paiagiaph "(10)" for "(9)" Formei pai (9) redesignated (10) 
Subsec (h)(10) PubL 98-369, § 712(k)(6)(A) ^designated formei pai (9) as (10) 
Subsec (h)(ll) to (15) PubL 98-369, § 712(k)(6)(C) added pais (11) to (15) 
Subsec (l) PubL 98-369, § 712(k)(7), pio\ided in intioductory text that the legulations be appiopnate to carry 
out the purposes of this section, designated existing pio\isions as pai (1) and substituted theiem "tieatment of 
stock and asset sales and puichases" foi "tieatment of stock and asset puichases with iespect to a taiget corpoiation 
and its target affiliates (v\hethei by tieating all of them as stock purchases oi as asset puichases)" pieceding "may 
not be cncumvented" and added pai (2) 
1983 Amendments Subsec (h)(8), (9) PubL 97-448. added pars (8) and (9) 
Effective and Applicability Provisions 
2004 Acts PubL 108-357, Title VIII § 839(b) Oct 22,2004 118 Stat 1597, provided that "The amendment 
made by subsection (a) [amending subsec (h)(13) of this section] shall apply to transactions occumng after the 
date of the enactment of this Act [Oct 22, 2004] " 
2003 Acts Amendments made by Pub L 108-27, § 302, applicable to taxable years beginning aftei Dec 31, 2002, 
except such amendments applicable to taxable yeais ending after Dec 31, 2002, for regulated investment company 
oi a leal estate investment trust, and except that dividends received by such a company or trust on or before such 
date not to be treated as qualified dividend income, see PubL 108-27, § 302(f), set out as a note under 26 
U S C A § 1 
1990 Acts Section 11323(d) of PubL 101-508 provided that 
"(1) In general.-Except as piovided in paragraph (2), the amendments made by this section [amending this 
section and sections 1060 and 6724 of this title] shall apply to acquisitions after October 9, 1990 
"(2) Binding contract exception.-The amendments made by this section shall not apply to any acquisition 
puisuant to a wiitten binding contract in effect on Octobei 9, 1990, and at all times theieaftei before such 
acquisition " 
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1988 Acts Amendment made by sections 1006(e)(20), (d)(9) of Pub L 100-647 effective as if included m the 
piOMsions of Pub L 99-514 to which such amendment lelates except that no addition to tax shall be made under 
section 6654 oi 6655 of this title foi any penod befoie Api 16, 1989 (Mai 16, 1989 in the case ot a taxpayei 
subject to section 6655 of this title) with lespect to any undeipayment to the extent such underpayment was cieated 
oi inci eased by any piovision of Titles I oi II of Pub L 100-647, see section 1019 of Pub L 100-647, set out as a 
note undei section 1 of this title 
Section 1012(bb)(5)(B) of Pub L 100-647 piovided that "The amendment made by subpaiagraph (A) [enacting 
subsec (h)(16)] shall apply to qualified stock puichases (as defined in section 338(d)(3) of the 1986 Code [subsec 
(d)(3) of this section]) after Maich 31, 1988, except that in the case of an election undei section 338(h)(10) of the 
1986 Code [subsec (h)(10) of this section], such amendment shall apply to qualified stock purchases (as so 
defined) aftei June 10, 1987" 
1986 Acts Amendment by section 631(b) and (e)(5) of Pub L 99-514 applicable to any distribution in complete 
liquidation, and any sale oi exchange, made by a corpoiation aftei July 31, 1986, unless such corporation is 
completely liquidated befoie Jan 1, 1987, any tiansaction descnbed m section 338 of this title for which the 
acquisition date occuis aftei Dec 31, 1986, and any distnbution, not in complete liquidation, made after Dec 31, 
1986, with exceptions and special and tiansitional rules, see section 633 of Pub L 99-514, set out as a note under 
section 336 of this title 
Amendment by section 1275(c)(6) of Pub L 99-514 to apply to taxable years beginning aftei Dec 31, 1986, with 
certain exceptions and qualifications, see section 1277 of Pub L 99-514, set out as a note under section 931 of this 
title 
Amendment by sections 1801 to 1880 of Pub L 99-514 effective as if included in the piovisions of the Tax Reform 
Act of 1984 Pub L 98-369, except as otheiwise piouded see section 1881 of Pub L 99-514. set out as a note 
under section 48 of this title 
Section 1804(e)(8)(B) of Pub L 99-514 piovided that "The amendment made by subparagiaph (A) [amending 
subsec (d)(3) of this section] shall apply in cases wheie the 12-month acquisition period (as defined in section 
338(h)(1) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954) [subsec (h)(1) of this section] begins after December 31, 1985 " 
1984 Acts Section 712(k)(9) of Pub L 98-369 provided that 
"(A) In general.-The amendments made by this subsection [amending this section and sections 269 and 318(b)(4) 
of this title] shall not apply to any qualified stock purchase (as defined m section 338(d)(3) of the Internal Revenue 
Code of 1954 [subsec (d)(3) of this section]) where the acquisition date (as defined in section 338(h)(2) of such 
Code [subsec (h)(2) of this section]) is before September 1, 1982 
"(B) Extension of time for making election.-In the case of any qualified stock purchase descnbed in 
subpaiagiaph (A), the time foi making an election under section 338 of such Code [this section] shall not expire 
before the close of the 60th day after the date of the enactment of this Act [July 18, 1984] " 
Amendment by section 712(k) of Pub L 98-369, except wheie otherwise piovided, effective as if included m 
provision of Pub L 97-248, The Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982, to which such amendment 
relates, see section 715 of Pub L 98-369, set out as a note undei section 31 of this title 
1983 Acts Amendment by Pub L 97-448 to take effect as if included in the provisions of the Tax Equity and 
Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982 [Pub L 97-248] to which such amendment lelates, see section 311(d) of Pub L 
97- 448, set out as a note undei section 31 of this title 
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1982 Acts Section 224(d) of Pub L 97-248, as amended Pub L 97-448, Title III, § 306(a)(8)(B), Jan 12, 1983, 
96 Stat 2403, piovided that 
"(1) In general.-The amendments made by this section [enacting this section and amending sections 168, 318, 
334, 336, 337, 381 and 617 of this title] shall apply to any taiget corpoiation (withm the meaning of section 338 of 
the Internal Re\enue Code of 1954 [this section] as added by this section) with lespect to which the acquisition 
date (within the meaning of such section) occurs after August 31, 1982 
"(2) Certain acquisitions before September 1,1982.-If~ 
"(A) an acquisition date (withm the meaning of section 338 of such Code [this section] without legaid to 
paiagiaph (5) of this subsection) occurred aftei August 31, 1980, and before Septembei 1, 1982, 
"(B) the target corpoiation (within the meaning of section 338 of such Code) is not liquidated before September 
1, 1982, ancT 
"(C) the puichasing corpoiation (within the meaning of section 338 of such Code [this section]) makes, not later 
than Novembei 15, 1982, an election undei section 338 [this section] of such Code, 
then the amendments made by this section shall apply to the acquisition of such taiget corpoiation 
"(3) Certain acquisitions of financial institutions.-In any case m which-
"(A) theie is on July 22, 1982, a binding contiact to acqune contiol (withm the meaning of section 368(c) of 
such Code [section 338(c) of this title]) of any financial institution, 
"(B) the appioxal of one oi moie legulatory authoiities is lequned in oidei to complete such acquisition and 
"(C) within 90 days aftei the date of the final appio\al of the last such legulatoiy authonty gianting final 
appio\al, a plan of complete liquidation of such financial institution is adopted, 
then the puichasing coiporation may elect not to have the amendments made by this section apply to the acquisition 
pursuant to such contract " 
"(4) Extension of time for making elections; revocation of elections.— 
"(A) Extension.--The time for making an election under section 338 of such Code [this section] shall not expire 
befoie the close of February 28, 1983 
"(B) Revocation.-Any election made under section 338 of such Code [this section] may be revoked by the 
puichasing corpoiation if revoked before March 1, 1983 
"(5) Rules for acquisitions described in paragraph (2).--
"(A) In general.-For purposes of applying section 338 of such Code [this section] with lespect to any 
acquisition desciibed m paragraph (2)— 
"(i) the date selected undei subparagraph (B) of this paiagraph shall be heated as the acquisition date, 
"(ii) a rule similai to the last sentence of section 334(b)(2) of such Code [section 334(b)(2) of this title] (as m 
effect on August 31, 1982) shall apply, and 
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"(in) subsections (e), (f), and (1) of such section 338, and paiagiaphs (4), (6), (8), and (9) of subsection (h) of 
such section 338, shall not apply 
M(B) Selection ol acquisition date by purchasing corporation.-The purchasing corpoiation may select any 
date foi purposes of subpaiagiaph (A)(i) if such date-
"(i) is aftei the latei of June 30, 1982, oi the acquisition date (within the meaning of section 338 of such Code 
[this section] without legaid to this paiagraph), and 
"(ii) is on oi befoie the date on which the election descnbed in paragiaph (2)(C) is made " 
Sunset Piovisions 
Amendments made to this section by Pub L 108-27, Title III, not applicable to tax years beginning after Dec 31, 
2008, and Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to apply and be administered as if such amendments had nevei been 
enacted, see Pub L 108-27, § 303, set out as a Sunset Provision under 26 U S C A § 1 
Special Rule foi Ceitain Distnbutions Befoie January 1, 1988, Title VI, Subtitle D Amendments Inapplicable 
See section 1804(b)(3) of Pub L 99-514, amending piovisions set out as a note undei section 311 of this title 
PiIOI Piovisions 
A pi ioi section 338. Act Aug 16. 1954, c 736, 68 A Stat 107 and which made lefeience to a special ruling on the 
effect on earnings and piofits of ceitain distnbutions in paitial liquidation in loimei section 312(e), was lepealed 
by Pub L 97-248 Title II, § 222(e)(4), Sept 3, 1982, 96 Stat 480 
Treatment of Ceitain Corpoiation Oiganized on February 22, 1983 
Section 1804(e)(9) of Pub L 99-514 piovided that "In the case of a Rhode Island corpoiation which was 
oiganized on Febiuary 22, 1983, and which on February 25, 1983— 
"(A) puichased the stock of another corpoiation, 
"(B) filed an election undei section 338(g) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 [subsec (g) of this section] with 
respect to such purchase, and 
"(C) meiged into the acquired coiporation, 
such purchase of stock shall be considered as made by the acquiring corporation, such election shall be valid, and 
the acquiring coiporation shall be considered a puichasmg corporation for purposes of section 338 of such Code 
[this section] without regaid to the duration of the existence of the acquiring corporation " 
Tax Treatment of Com ail Public Sale 
Pub L 99-509, Title VIII, § 8021, Oct 21, 1986, 100 Stat 1874, piovided that 
"(a) Treatment as new corporation.— 
"(1) In general.-Foi periods after the public sale, foi purposes of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 [prior to 
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ledesignation as Internal Revenue Code of 1986 by Pub L 99-514] Com ail shall be tieated as a new corpoiation 
which puichased all of its assets as of the beginning of the day aftei the date of the public sale for an amount 
equal to the deemed pui chase pi ice 
"(2) Allocation among assets.-The deemed pui chase puce shall be allocated among the assets of Coniail in 
accoidance with the temporaiy regulations piescnbed undei section 338 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 
(as such legulations weie in effect on the date of the enactment oi this Act) [Oct 21, 1986] The Secretaiy shall 
establish specific guidelines for canymg out the pieceding sentence so that the basis of each asset will be clearly 
asceitainable Foi purposes of applying the legulations iefened to in the fust sentence, accounts receivable and 
materials and supplies shall be tieated as cash equivalents 
"(3) Deemed purchase price.—For purposes of this subsection, the deemed puichase price is an amount equal to 
the gioss amount received pursuant to the public sale, multiplied by a fiaction— 
"(A) the numerator of which is 100 percent, and 
"(B) the denominatoi of which is the peicentage (by value) of the stock of Coniail sold in the public sale 
The amount deteimined undei the preceding sentence shall be adjusted undei legulations prescribed by the 
Secietary foi liabilities of Conrail and othei relevant items 
"(b) No income from cancellation of debt or prelerred stock.~No amount shall be included in the gross income 
of any peison by leason of any cancellation of any obligation (or piefened stock) of Coniail in connection with the 
public sale 
"(c) Disallowance ol certain deductions.—No deduction shall be allowed to Com ail foi any amount which is paid 
aftei the date of the public sale to employees of Coniail foi seivices perfoimed on oi befoie the date of the public 
sale 
"(d) Wahei ol certain emplovee stock ownership plan provisions.—Foi purposes of detei mining whethei the 
employee stock ownership plans of Conrail meet the qualifications of sections 401 and 501 of the Internal Revenue 
Code of 1954-
"(1) the limits of section 415 of such Code (relating to limitations on benefits and contributions under qualified 
plans) shall not apply with lespect to inteiests in stock transfened puisuant to this Act [Pub L 99-509, Oct 21, 
1986, 100 Stat 1874] or a law heretofore enacted, and 
"(2) the 2-year waiting period for withdiawals shall not apply to withdrawals of amounts (or shaies) in 
paiticipants accounts in connection with the public sale 
"(e) Definitions.—For purposes of this section— 
"(1) Conrail.—The term 'Conrail' means the Consolidated Rail Corporation Such term includes any corporation 
which was a subsidiary of Conrail immediately befoie the public sale 
"(2) Public sale.-The term 'public sale' means the sale of stock m Coniail pursuant to a public offering undei 
the Comail Privatization Act [Subtitle A of Title IV of Pub L 99-509] If there is moie than 1 public offering 
undei such Act such teim means the sale pursuant to the initial public offeung under such Act 
"(3) Secretary .-The term 'Secretary' means the Secretaiy of the Treasury or his delegate " 
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Special Rules toi Deemed Pui chases Undei Pnoi Law 
Section 712(k)(10) of Pub L 98 169 piovided that "If befoie Octobei 20, 1983 a coipoiation was tieated as 
making a qualified stock puichase (as defined in section 338(d)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 [subsec 
(d)(3) of this section]), but would not be so tieated undei the amendments made by paiagiaphs (5) [amending this 
section and section 318(b)(4) of this title] and (6) [amending this section] of this subsection, the amendments made 
by such paiagiaphs shall not apply to such puichase unless such coipoiation elects (at such time and m such 
mannei as the Secietaiy of the Tieasmy oi his delegate may by legulations piescnbe) to have the amendments 
made by such paiagiaphs apply " 
Exception foi Stock Pui chases in Contemplation of Taiget Coipoiation as Membei of Affiliated Gioup 
Section 306(a)(8)(A)(n) of Pub L 97-448, as amended Pub L 98-369, Div A, Title VII, § 722(a)(3), July 18, 
1984, 98 Stat 973 piovided that "If-
"(I) any portion of a qualified stock puichase is pursuant to a binding conhact enteied into on oi aftei September 
1 1982 [Sept 3, 1982], and on oi befoie the date of the enactment of this Act [Jan 12 1983], and 
"(II) the puichasing corporation establishes by cleai and convincing evidence that such contract was negotiated on 
the contemplation that, with respect to the deemed sale undei section 338 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 
[this section], the taiget corporation would be tieated as a membei of the affiliated group which includes the selling 
coipoiation 
then the amendment made by clause (I) [amending subsec (h) of this section] shall not apply to such qualified 
stock purchase " 
CROSS REFERENCES 
Election ie\ocation, and termination of S coipoiations, see 26 USCA § 1362 
Limitation on net opeiatmg loss carryforwards and certain built-in losses following owneiship change see 
26 USCA ^382 
Qualified stock puichase by coipoiation of anothei corporation to evade oi avoid income tax, see 26 USCA 
§269 
Special allocation rules foi certain asset acquisitions, see 26 USCA § 1060 
Treatment of Conrail public sale, see 45 USCA § 1347 
CODE OF FEDERAL REGULATIONS 
Rules relating to elections, see 26 CFR § 1 338-IT et seq 
LAW REVIEW COMMENTARIES 
Basis and gam consideiations in corporate acquisitions/changes under the Tax Reform Act of 1986 
Gregory L Richey, 10 L A Law 12 (Sept 1987) 
Contingent income items and cost basis corporate acquisitions conelative adjustments and clearer 
€ 2007 Thomson/West No Claim to Ons U S Govt Woiks 
ADDENDUM 
B 
ORIGINAL 
• • - i . ' 
Code $1425 
JOHNFRANKOVICH 
State of Nevada Bar #667 Mnn HIM
 n D.. , , . 
TODD J. DRESSEL Z l U jUnf "7 PH I,: I* | 
State of Nevada Bar #5936
 A M V , M D „ r y 
MCDONALD CARANO WILSON McCUNE ^ n * • < A ^ 3 TJ^ERK 
BY. BERGIN FRANKOVICH & HICKS LLP 
241 Ridge Street v ' —^F^?, 
P.O. Box 2670 CcFdu 
Reno, Nevada 89505 
(775) 788-2000 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA 
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF WASHOE 
DENNIS MANDELL and ROBERT KAY, Case No.U _ *~ 
Dept. No. - y 
Plaintiffs, r 
vs. 
GERALD KEITH MEYER, RICHARD 
BRIEDENBACH, ELLIOTT ASHFORD, 
WILLIAM STEVE TILLETT, as Co-
Trustees of the GENE WHITWORTH 
TRUST, established November 6,1991, 
GERALD KEITH MEYER, RICHARD 
BRIEDENBACH, ELLIOT ASHFORD, 
WILLIAM STEVE TILLETT, 
as Co-Executors of the EUGENE 
NEAL WHITWORTH ESTATE, and 
DOES I-X, 
Defendants. 
/ 
COMPLAINT 
Plaintiffs, by and through their counsel of record, McDONALD CARANO WILSON 
McCUNE BERGIN FRANKOVICH & HICKS LLP, as and for a Complaint against the above-named 
Defendants, alleges as follows: 
PARTIES 
1. Plaintiff Dennis J. Mandell is a resident of Washoe County, Nevada. 
2. Plaintiff Robert Kay is a resident of Medford, Oregon. 
1 || 3. Defendants, Gerald Keith Meyer, Richard Briedenbach, Elliott Ashford and William 
2 || Steve Tillett, Co-Trustees of the Gene Whitworth Trust established on November 6, 1991, with its 
3 || principal place of business in Washoe County, Nevada, and as successors in interest to Eugene Neal 
4 || Whitworth and the Eugene Neal Whitworth Estate, are sued herein for purposes of a constructive trust. 
5 || 4. Defendants, Gerald Keith Meyer, Richard Briedenbach, Elliot Ashford and William Steve 
6 II Tillett, Co-Executors of the Eugene Neal Whitworth Estate, which is a probate estate created in the 
7 State of Nevada, administered in the Second Judicial District Court of the State of Nevada, in and for 
8 the County of Washoe, as Case Number CV98-07436 with its principal place of business located in the 
9 State of Nevada and is a successor in interest to Eugene Neal Whitworth, are sued herein for the 
10 purposes of a constructive trust. 
11 5. Eugene Neal Whitworth was an individual who resided and owned real property and 
12 maintained his principal residence in Washoe County, Nevada. Eugene Neal Whitworth died on or 
13 about November 23, 1998, in the State of California. 
14 6. Plaintiffs do not know the true names and/or capacities of the Defendants sued herein 
15 as DOES I-X, inclusive, and prays leave that when their true names and/or capacities are ascertained, 
16 Plaintiffs may be permitted to insert the same herein with the appropriate allegations, but upon 
17 information and belief, the Plaintiffs allege that each of said Defendants is legally responsible for the 
18 events and happenings referred to herein and proximately caused damage to the Plaintiffs as alleged 
19 herein. 
20 GENERAL ALLEGATIONS 
21 7. Prior to April 1,1998, Plaintiffs DENNIS MANDELL and ROBERT KAY (hereinafter 
22 collectively the "MINORITY SHAREHOLDERS"), owned a minority interest in Homes America of 
23 Utah, Inc. and U.S.A. Mobile Homes, Inc. respectively. Both Homes America of Utah, Inc. and U.S.A. 
24 Mobile Homes, Inc. were predominately owned by EUGENE NEAL WHITWORTH 
25 I ("WHITWORTH"). 
26 || 8. WHITWORTH was also a director and/or officer of the MINORITY 
27 j SHAREHOLDERS' respective corporations. 
28 || 9. At or near that time, WHITWORTH entered into an agreement with Champion Home 
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1 || Centers, Inc., for the combined sale of the Whitworth Management, Inc., Homes America of Arizona, 
2 II Inc., American Transport, Inc., U.S.A. Mobile Homes, Inc., Factory Homes Outlet, Inc., Homes 
3 America of Oklahoma, Inc., Homes America of California, Inc., Homes America of Utah, Inc., and 
4 Homes America Finance, Inc. (collectively referred to as "Homes America") for a total purchase price 
5 of $102,500,000.00. 
6 10. The overall transaction called for a portion of the total purchase price to be paid in cash 
7 at the time of closing with the remaining portion to be paid out on a deferred basis based upon future 
8 performance by Homes America. 
9 I 11. WHITWORTH assured the MINORITY SHAREHOLDERS that the performance 
10 criteria would be met. 
11 12. The transaction involved the sale of several corporations, including those in which the 
12 MINORITY SHAREHOLDERS held an interest, and a separate agreement was prepared for each of 
13 the corporations. 
14 13. On April 1,1998, WHITWORTH, together with his legal counsel, orchestrated a closing 
15 event in Palm Springs, California. The MINORITY SHAREHOLDERS, and others holding interest 
16 in the various corporations, were gathered together for the purpose of executing the purchase 
17 agreements and related documents. 
18 14. Prior to the closing event, none of the MINORITY SHAREHOLDERS were informed 
19 of the terms of the entire Homes America Sale; including the total purchase price, the allocation of the 
20 total purchase price to the individual corporations including those in which they held their respective 
21 interests or the allocation of the total purchase price paid in cash at closing, nor were the MINORITY 
22 SHAREHOLDERS given the opportunity to read or review the purchase agreements. 
23 15. The MINORITY SHAREHOLDERS were infonned by WHITWORTH that if anybody 
24 failed to sign, the transaction would not proceed. 
25 16. WHITWORTH had also told the MINORITY SHAREHOLDERS that if they did not 
26 I accept their respective agreements, their positions with Homes America would be terminated and their 
27 || minority interests would be worthless. 
28 || /// 
1 II 17. At the closing event of April 1, 1998, the MINORITY SHAREHOLDERS were not 
2 || given the opportunity to review their respective agreements but were merely presented with agreements 
3 || opened to the signature page for their respective signatures together with the signature of their spouses 
4 || and ordered to sign. The terms and conditions of these agreements were not explained to the 
5 II MINORITY SHAREHOLDERS. 
6 18. During the closing event, WHITWORTH continually pressured the MINORITY 
7 SHAREHOLDERS to huiry up and sign their agreements. 
8 19. The MINORITY SHAREHOLDERS have discovered that the allocations of the purchase 
9 price fixed by WHITWORTH for each corporation were not based upon the actual values of each 
10 corporation compared to the total purchase price offered by Champion Home Centers, Inc. Instead, 
11 WHITWORTH's allocations inflated the values of those companies that he exclusively owned or where 
12 he had a larger percentage of ownership. These allocations decreased the true value of the MINORITY 
13 SHAREHOLDERS' ownership in their respective corporations of Homes America. 
14 20. WHITWORTH also allocated a substantially larger percentage of the cash portion of the 
15 purchase price to himself as compared to the cash paid to the MINORITY SHAREHOLDERS. The 
16 MINORITY SHAREHOLDERS were left relying upon achieving the uncertain performance criteria 
17 for the bulk of their allocated purchase price. 
18 21. On information and belief, WHITWORTH has transferred and assigned to the Gene 
19 Whitworth Trust payments of money, effects and other valuable things, received by WHITWORTH as 
20 a result of his disproportionate allocation of the purchase price and cash payments related to the Homes 
21 America sale. 
22 22. On or about November 23, 1998, WHITWORTH died in Palm Springs, California. 
23 23. The Eugene Neal Whitworth Estate was subsequently filed in the Second Judicial 
24 District Court of the State of Nevada, in and for the County of Washoe. All the property of the estate 
25 was distributed to Gerald Keith Meyer, Richard Briedenbach, Elliott Ashford and William Steve Tillett, 
26 as Co-Trustees of the Eugene Neal Whitworth Trust. 
27 24. As a result of the above conduct of WHITWORTH, the MINORITY SHAREHOLDERS 
28 have been forced to employ the services of attorneys to prosecute this action. The MINORITY 
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SHAREHOLDERS have incurred, and will continue to incur, attorney's fees and costs in an amount that 
cannot presently be determined. 
FIRST CLAIM FOR RELIEF 
(Constructive Fraud - Breach of Fiduciary Duties) 
25. Paragraphs 1 through 24 are incorporated by reference as if set forth at length and in full. 
26. At all material times herein, a confidential relationship existed between the MINORITY 
SHAREHOLDERS and WHITWORTH in that a special trust and confidence was placed upon 
WHITWORTH by the MINORITY SHAREHOLDERS due to his position of power as the controlling 
and dominant shareholder and as director and/or officer in the various corporations of Homes America. 
27. By virtue of the acts and omissions described herein, WHITWORTH breached his 
fiduciary duty to the MINORITY SHAREHOLDERS in engaging in self-dealing, tortious conduct and 
his failure to disclose all the necessary facts to the MINORITY SHAREHOLDERS. 
28. The MINORITY SHAREHOLDERS executed the agreements on the representations of 
WHITWORTH and because of the fiduciary relationship between the MINORITY SHAREHOLDERS 
and WHITWORTH. WHITWORTH induced the MINORITY SHAREHOLDERS to enter into their 
respective agreements for the purpose of enabling WHITWORTH to secure for his own personal benefit 
certain profits and advantages and he did secure these advantages. WHITWORTH failed to fully 
disclose all the facts of the transaction to the MINORITY SHAREHOLDERS and made false 
representations and omissions to the MINORITY SHAREHOLDERS as described herein. The 
MINORITY SHAREHOLDERS would not have entered into the transaction if they had known that the 
facts were not as they were represented to them. 
29. Gerald Keith Meyer, Richard Briedenbach, Elliott Ashford and William Steve Tillett as 
Co-Trustees of the Gene Whitworth Trust, as the successor of WHITWORTH, and as successor of the 
Eugene Neal Whitworth Estate, have actual and imputed knowledge of WHITWORTH's constructive 
fraud in his breach of trust to the MINORITY SHAREHOLDERS. 
30. Gerald Keith Meyer, Richard Briedenbach, Elliot Ashford and William Steve Tillett as 
Co-Executors of the Eugene Neal Whitworth Estate, as the successor of WHITWORTH, have actual 
and imputed knowledge of WHITWORTH's constructive fraud in his breach of trust to the MINORITY 
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SHAREHOLDERS. 
31. Adherence to the fiction that the Gene Whitworth Trust and the Eugene Neal Whitworth 
Estate are separate independent entities without successor liability would promote injustice in that it 
would allow WHITWORTH to avoid his fiduciary duty and escape liability for WHITWORTH's 
constructive fraud in his breach of trust to the MINORITY SHAREHOLDERS. 
32. As a proximate result of this conduct by WHITWORTH and the Defendants, the 
MINORITY SHAREHOLDERS have suffered actual harm and damages in excess of $10,000.00. 
SECOND CLAIM FOR RELIEF 
(Fraud, Deceit and/or Misrepresentation) 
33. Paragraphs 1 through 32 are incorporated by reference as if set forth at length and in full. 
34. WHITWORTH and his agents or representatives made the above-described 
representations and/or concealed facts with the intention that the MINORITY SHAREHOLDERS 
would act on such representations or refrain from acting due to the concealed facts, and the MINORITY 
SHAREHOLDERS did, in fact, act and rely on the same, or fail to act to protect themselves, to their 
injury as set forth herein. 
35. Said actions were false, fraudulent and deceitful and were known to be false, fraudulent 
and deceitful by WHITWORTH at the time said acts and omissions were made. 
36. WHITWORTH and his duly authorized agents fraudulently concealed from the 
MINORITY SHAREHOLDERS the above-described facts, knowing that if they had disclosed the truth 
of the matter to the MINORITY SHAREHOLDERS, the MINORITY SHAREHOLDERS would have 
acted to protect their interests. 
37. In reliance on the representations made by WHITWORTH and unaware of the 
fraudulently concealed facts, the MINORITY SHAREHOLDERS acted to their detriment, or failed to 
take necessary steps to protect themselves against WHITWORTH's acts and omissions. 
38. WHITWORTH and its duly authorized agents were possessed of superior knowledge 
and at all times knew, or should have known, that their misrepresentations and concealment of material 
facts from the MINORITY SHAREHOLDERS constituted fraud on their part. 
39. But for WHITWORTH's representations and concealments, the MINORITY 
6 
1 II SHAREHOLDERS would not have acted as it did and would have taken steps to protect their interests. 
2 || 40. The MINORITY SHAREHOLDERS acted in reliance on WHITWORTH's 
3 || misrepresentations and concealments under circumstances justifying reliance. 
4 II 41. Gerald Keith Meyer, Richard Briedenbach, Elliott Ashford and William Steve Tillett as 
5 Co-Trustees of the Gene Whitworth Trust, as the successor of WHITWORTH, and as the successor of 
6 the Eugene Neal Whitworth Estate, have actual and imputed knowledge of WHITWORTH's wrongful 
7 conduct. 
8 42. Gerald Keith Meyer, Richard Breidenbach, Elliot Ashford and William Steve Tillett as 
9 Co-Executors of the Eugene Neal Whitworth Estate, as the successor of WHITWORTH, have actual 
10 and imputed knowledge of WHITWORTH's wrongful conduct. 
11 43. Adherence to the fiction that the Gene Whitworth Trust and the Eugene Neal Whitworth 
12 Estate are separate independent entities without successor liability would promote injustice in that it 
13 would allow WHITWORTH to escape liability for WHITWORTH's fraudulent conduct, deceit and 
14 misrepresentations to the MINORITY SHAREHOLDERS. 
15 44. As a proximate result of this conduct by WHITWORTH and the Defendants, the 
16 MINORITY SHAREHOLDERS have suffered actual harm and damages in excess of $10,000.00. 
17 THIRD CLAIM FOR RELIEF 
18 (Undue Influence and Duress) 
19 45. Paragraphs 1 through 46 are incorporated by reference as if set forth at length and in full. 
20 46. WHITWORTH and his agents or representatives made the above-described 
21 representations with the intention to unfairly persuade the MINORITY SHAREHOLDERS to act on 
22 such representations or refrain from acting due to the concealed facts, and the MINORITY 
23 SHAREHOLDERS did, in fact, act and rely on the same, or fail to act to protect themselves, to theii 
24 injury as set forth herein. 
25 47. But for WHITWORTH's exercise of undue influence over the MINORITY 
26 SHAREHOLDERS, the MINORITY SHAREHOLDERS would not have accepted the allocations se 
27 by WHITWORTH of the purchase price and cash payments that disproportionately benefittec 
28 WHITWORTH. 
1 II 48. Gerald Keith Meyer, Richard Briedenbach, Elliott Ashford and William Steve Tillett as 
2 || Co-Trustees of the Gene Whitworth Trust, as the successor of WHITWORTH, and as the successor to 
3 II the Eugene Neal Whitworth Estate, have actual and imputed knowledge of WHITWORTH's undue 
4 influence and duress upon the MINORITY SHAREHOLDERS. 
5 49. Gerald Keith Meyer, Richard Briedenbach, Elliot Ashford and William Steve Tillett as 
6 Co-Executors of the Eugene Neal Whitworth Estate, as the successor of WHITWORTH, have actual 
7 and imputed knowledge of WHITWORTH's undue influence and duress upon the MINORITY 
8 SHAREHOLDERS. 
9 A 50. Adherence to the fiction that the Gene Whitworth Trust and the Eugene Neal Whitworth 
10 Estate are separate independent entities without successor liability would promote injustice in that it 
11 would allow WHITWORTH to escape liability for WHITWORTH's undue influence and duress upon 
12 the MINORITY SHAREHOLDERS. 
13 51. As a proximate result of this conduct by WHITWORTH and the Defendants, the 
14 MINORITY SHAREHOLDERS have suffered actual harm and damages in excess of $10,000.00. 
15 FOURTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF 
|| 
16 (Unjust Enrichment) 
17 52. Paragraphs 1 through 52 are incorporated by reference as if set forth at length and in full. 
18 53. As a result of WHITWORTH's acts and omissions complained of herein, 
19 WHITWORTH has been unjustly enriched in a sum in excess often thousand dollars ($10,000.00). 
20 54. WHITWORTH's taking and retention of the MINORITY SHAREHOLDERS money 
21 through his inequitable allocation of the MINORITY SHAREHOLDERS' ownership in their respective 
22 corporations and portion of the up-front cash payment were done by WHITWORTH under 
23 circumstances such that it would be inequitable for WHITWORTH to retain the benefit resulting to 
24 I them from their acts and omissions against the MINORITY SHAREHOLDERS. 
25 II 55. WHITWORTH should not be permitted to enrich themselves at the expense of the 
26 MINORITY SHAREHOLDERS. 
27 56. Under the circumstances described herein, it would be unfair to allow WHITWORTH 
28 I to retain the substantial benefit received without paying for such benefit. 
8 
1 || 57. Gerald Keith Meyer, Richard Briedenbach, Elliott Ashford and William Steve Tillett as 
2 || Co-Trustees of the Gene Whitworth Trust, as the successor of WHITWORTH, and as the successor to 
3 the Eugene Neal Whitworth Estate, have actual and imputed knowledge of WHITWORTH's unjust 
4 enrichment. 
5 58. Gerald Keith Meyer, Richard Briedenbach, Elliot Ashford and William Steve Tillett as 
6 Co-Executors of the Eugene Neal Whitworth Estate, as the successor of WHITWORTH, have actual 
7 and imputed knowledge of WHITWORTH's unjust enrichment. 
8 59. Adherence to the fiction that the Gene Whitworth Trust and the Eugene Neal Whitworth 
9 Estate are separate independent entities without successor liability would promote injustice in that it 
10 would unjustly enrich WHITWORTH and award his wrongful conduct to the detriment of the 
11 MINORITY SHAREHOLDERS. 
12 60. As a direct and proximate result of WHITWORTH and Defendants' unjust enrichment, 
13 the MINORITY SHAREHOLDERS have been damaged and are entitled to an award of restitutionary 
14 damages to be proven at trial. 
15 WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs pray for judgment against Defendants as follows: 
16 FIRST FORM OF RELIEF REQUESTED 
17 Equitable imposition of a constructive trust upon 
18 Defendants as constructive trustees 
19 61. Paragraphs 1 through 60 are incorporated by reference as if set forth at length and in full. 
20 62. WHITWORTH's allocation of the purchase price and cash payments to the Plaintiffs as 
21 a result of his constructive fraud - breach of fiduciary duty, fraud, deceit and/or misrepresentation, 
22 undue influence/duress and unjust enrichment devalued the Plaintiffs' minority ownership interests in 
23 their respective Homes America corporations and gave WHITWORTH a disproportionate amount of 
24 the up-front cash payments. WHITWORTH was the controlling and dominate shareholder of the 
25 various Homes America corporations creating a confidential relationship of trust between the 
26 MINORITY SHAREHOLDERS and WHITWORTH. Despite that fiduciary relationship, 
27 WHITWORTH breached that trust. 
28 I 63. A constructive trust is a remedial device by which the holder of legal title to property 
9 
1 is held to be a trustee for that property for the benefit of another who in good conscience is entitled to 
2 it. 
3 II 64. Under the facts alleged herein, the retention by WHITWORTH, or by any assignee, 
4 II transferee, or successor of WHITWORTH, including the Eugene Neal Whitworth Estate and the Gene 
5 Whitworth Trust, of the remaining value of the Plaintiffs' portion of the purchase price and cash 
6 payments would be inequitable and the imposition of a constructive trust is essential to the effectuation 
7 of justice. 
8 65. On information and belief, money, effects, and other valuable things, received by 
9 WHITWORTH as a result of the allegations set forth above, were gratuitously transferred to the Eugene 
10 Neal Whitworth Estate, and that the Eugene Neal Whitworth Estate received these benefits with actual, 
11 constructive or imputed knowledge of Plaintiffs' claims. 
12 66. On information and belief, Defendants Gerald Keith Meyer, Richard Briedenbach, Elliott 
13 Ashford and William Steve Tillett, Co-Trustees of the Gene Whitworth Trust established on November 
14 6, 1991, received gratuitously money, effects, and other valuable things, received by WHITWORTH 
15 as a result of the allegations set forth above. Gerald Keith Meyer, Richard Briedenbach, Elliott Ashford 
16 and William Steve Tillett, Co-Trustees of the Gene Whitworth Trust established on November 6,1991, 
17 received these rights, benefits or proceeds with actual, constructive or imputed knowledge of Plaintiffs' 
18 claims. 
19 67. On information and belief, Defendants Gerald Keith Meyer, Richard Briedenbach, Elliot 
20 Ashford and William Steve Tillett, Co-Executors of the Eugene Neal Whitworth Estate, received 
21 gratuitously money, effects, and other valuable things, received by WHITWORTH as a result of the 
22 allegations set forth above. Gerald Keith Meyer, Richard Briedenbach, Elliot Ashford and William 
23 Steve Tillett, Co-Executors of the Eugene Neal Whitworth Estate, received these rights, benefits or 
24 proceeds with actual, constructive or imputed knowledge of Plaintiff s claims. 
25 68. Plaintiffs request a judicial declaration and order imposing a constructive trust upon the 
26 defendants herein. 
27 69. Plaintiffs further request an order directing Defendants, in its capacity as a trustee of this 
28 I constructive trust, to convey and transfer those assets to the equitable owner, Plaintiffs. 
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SECOND FORM OF RELIEF REQUESTED 
Compensatory and genera] damages in excess of $10,000.00 
according to proof at trial 
70. Plaintiffs have been damaged in excess of $ 10,000.00, will submit evidence to establish 
and prove the full amount of damages at trial, and requests that this Court order the full amount of 
Plaintiffs damages to be paid by Defendants to Plaintiffs. 
THIRD FORM OF RELIEF REQUESTED 
For attorney fees and costs of suit herein incurred 
71. As a direct and proximate result of WHITWORTH's conduct, Plaintiffs have been forced 
to bring this lawsuit to enforce its rights. Plaintiff is entitled to all attorney's fees and costs of suit 
incurred in enforcing its rights which were violated by Defendants' bad acts. 
FOURTH FORM OF RELIEF REQUESTED 
For interest 
72. Plaintiffs pray for the interest on the amounts due from the date those amounts became 
due. 
16 FIFTH FORM OF RELIEF REQUESTED 
17 For further relief as the Court deems proper 
18 73. Plaintiffs further prays for such other and further relief as the Court deems necessary and 
19 appropriate in the circumstances. 
20 Dated this 7 ""Say of June, 2000. 
9i McDONALD CARANO WILSON McCUNE 
| BERGIN FRAMCOVICH & HICKS LLP 
22 
23 B U OHN FRAMCOVICH C 24 J N: 
" TODD J. DRESSEL 
25 II 241 Ridge Street, Fourth Floor 
Reno, Nevada 89501 
26 Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
27 
28 
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ADDENDUM 
C 
BEFORE THE UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION 
DENNIS & KATHY MANDELL, 
Petitioners, 
v 
AUDITING DIVISION OF 
THE UTAH STATE TAX 
COMMISSION, 
Respondent. 
FINDINGS OF FACT, 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, 
AND FINAL DECISION 
Appeal No. 03-1509 
Tax Period: 
Tax Type: 
Judge: 
2001 
Income Tax 
Davis 
Presiding: 
Palmer DePaulis, Commissioner 
Blaine Davis, Administrative Law Judge 
Appearances: 
For Petitioner: David W, Scofield, Attorney at Law 
For Respondent: Timothy A. Bodily, Assistant Attorney General 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This matter came before the Utah State Tax Commission for a Formal Hearing on 
January 13, 2005. The matter is before the Commission on an appeal of a Utah Individual Income Tax 
Audit deficiency issued for the tax year 2001. The parties stipulated to the admission of the exliibits 
contained in the exhibit binder with exhibits marked 1 through 15 representing the Petitioners' exhibits 
and exhibits 1 through 9 representing the Respondent's exhibits. The Commission admitted the exhibits 
into evidence. 
Based upon the evidence and testimony presented at the hearing, the exliibits as stipulated 
by the parties, and incorpoiating the proposed finds submitted by the parties the Tax Commission hereby 
makes its: 
Appeal No. 03-1509 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
]. Petitioners are appealing audit deficiency of Utah individual income tax issued for the tax 
year 2001. The Division issued on October 23, 2005, a Statutory Notice of Estimated Income Tax to the 
Mandells showing a deficiency in Utah state income tax for 2001 of $70,129.62, penalties of $14,025,92 
and interest of $6,148 as of the date of the assessment (See Respondent's Exhibit 1, "Statutory Notice".) 
2. The Mandells did not file a Utah state income tax return for the tax year 2001. They 
were not residents of the state of Utah for purposes of income tax for the year 2001. 
3. The deficiency represented by the Statutory Notice related to a $1,127,977.00 payment 
made to the Mandells as settlement of a lawsuit they had filed in the Second Judicial District Court of the 
State of Nevada against the estate of Eugene Whitworth. The lawsuit involved the actions of Mr. 
Whitworth during the negotiations and completion of the sale of Homes America of Utah, Inc. ("HAU") 
to Champion Homes, Inc. ("Champion"). (See Respondent's Exhibits 1, 3, 4 & 5.) 
4. The sale of HAU to Champion occurred in 1998, (See Respondent's Exhibit 6,) 
5. The Mandells were residents of the state of Utah when the sale of HAU to Champion 
occurred. 
6. While Dennis Mandell was a shareholder of HAU, HAU was a Utah corporation doing 
business in Utah that filed as a subchapter S corporation for federal income tax purposes. (See 
Respondent's Exhibit 6, ^ 3,13.2, "Stock Purchase Agreement") 
7. HAU sold mobile homes in Utah under the brand "Homes America." (See Respondent's 
Exhibit 5, p. 3, lines 18-20, "Motion for Summary Judgment".) 
8. Mr. Mandell managed HAU from its date of incorporation and the Mandells were 
residents of Utah from 1995 to March of 1999. 
9. HAU had three shareholders as follows: Mr. Mandell owned 20% of the stock, Gerald 
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Meyer owned 20% and Eugene Whitworth ("Whitworth") owned 60%. (See Respondent's Exliibit 1, p. 
57.) 
10. Mr. Mandell testified that his management services for HAU were performed in 
anticipation of an increase of the value of his stock interest in HAU. 
11. Mr. Whitworth, in addition to his controlling interest in HAU, controlled eight other 
corporations operating in states other than Utah, but in the same line of business as HAU. These 
corporations consisted of Whitworth Management, Inc., a Nevada corporation, Homes America of 
Arizona, Inc., an Arizona corporation, American Transport, Inc., a Nevada corporation, USA Mobile 
Homes, Inc., an Oregon corporation, Factory Homes Outlet, Inc., an Idaho corporation, Homes America 
of Oklahoma, Inc.. an Oklahoma corporation, Homes America of California, Inc., a California 
corporation, Homes America Finance, Inc., a Nevada corporation. (See Respondent's Exhibit 6, "Stock 
Purchase Agreement/' p. 49.) 
12. In 1998, Champion entered into negotiations with Mr. Whitworth for the purchase of 
HAU and the other eight corporations. 
13. Mr. WTiitworth and Champion negotiated a total price for the nine corporations, including 
HAU, of Si 02.5 million dollars. (See Respondent's Exhibit 5. "Motion for Summary Judgment," p.5.) 
14. As a condition of the purchase, Champion required that all corporations be part of the 
acquisition. (See Respondent's Exliibit 5, p.4, Ins 22-23.) 
15. The purchase price included $67.5 million in cash, $5 million in cash held back for 
eighteen months for unknown liabilities and $30 million in contingent payments based upon the 
combined future earnings of the nine corporations. (See Respondent's Exliibit 5, p.5, Exhibit 6, ^ 2.1.3.) 
16. The $67.5 million in cash and $5 million hold back was paid by Champion, but the $30 
million dollar contingent payment remained an unrealized contingency. (See Respondent's Exliibit 5, 
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p.5.) 
17. Mr. Whitworth allocated this purchase price to tlie nine corporations. 
] 8. Mr. Mandell summarized Whitworth's allocation of the purchase price as follows: 
Whitworth never obtained an independent valuation of tlie nine corporations. The 
allocation of purchase price for the nine corporations was simply established by 
Wliitwortli stating what he wanted to pay each minority shareholder . . . . The result of 
the Whitworth allocations was that approximately 90% of the purchase price or 96% of 
the cash went to Whitworth. Corporations owned 100% by Wliitwortli received 80% to 
100% allocated purchase price in cash. [HAU] received approximately 38% of tlie 
Wliitwortli allocation of the purchase price in cash. Even though the 1997 audited 
financial statements, the basis of the Champion transaction, established that the minority 
interests were valued at over 20% of the total net 1997 income for the nine corporations, 
Whitworth received $69,677,100.00 (96.11%) of the $72,500,000.00 cash portion of the 
purchase price paid by Champion Homes while the minority shareholders received a total 
of $2,822,900.00 (3.89%). 
(See Respondent's Exhibit 5, p.5, In 25, p. 6, Ins. 1-3, 11-21.) 
19. Mr. Whitworth directed that $8,105 million of the total $102.5 million purchase price be 
allocated to HAU. (See Respondent's Exhibit 5, p.6, Ins. 4-10.) 
20. Mr. Whitworth directed that only 38% (or $3,105 Million) of the $8,105 Million 
allocated to HAU be comprised of the cash portion of the purchase price with 62% (or $5 Million) 
pertaining to tlie deferred portion of tlie purchase price never realized. (See Respondent's Exhibit 6.) 
21. Mr. MandelPs interest in the $8,105 million purchase price was $1,671 million. (See 
Respondent's Exhibit 6.) However, the cash portion of tlie purchase price allocated to Mr. Mandell was 
only $621,000. 
22. Mr. Mandell received the $621,000 cash portion of the purchase price of HAU when he 
and tlie other shareholders consummated tlie sale to Champion Homes based upon tliese terms on March 
27, 1998, concurrently with the other Wliitwortli corporations. . (See Respondent's Exhibit 6, "Purchase 
Agreement".) Mr. Mandell did not receive any of tlie deferred portions 
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23. Mr. Mandell and the other shareholders made an IRC § 338(h)(10) election which caused 
the sale to be deemed an asset sale of the property of HAU and subsequent liquidation of the sale 
proceeds to the shareholders. (See Respondent's Exhibit 6, ^  3.13.11.) 
24. All of the shareholders in the other eight Whitworth corporations whose sale was also 
included in the transactions executed a Section 338(h)(10) election. (Respondent's Exhibit 8.) 
25. HAU and the other corporations stepped up the basis of their assets as a result of the sale 
and IRC § 338(h)(10) election. (See Respondent's Exhibit 7.) 
26. HAU reported Utah as its "commercial domicile" on its 1998 Utah income tax return. 
(See Respondent's Exhibit 7, p.2, In 3.) 
27. HAU reported on its Utah income tax return as business income the gain it received on its 
§ 338(h)(10) deemed sale of assets to Champion. (See Respondent's Exhibit 7, "HAU 1998 TC-20S", 
Schedule A, In. 5.b.) 
28. HAU reported a 100% business income apportionment fraction to Utah on its 1998 Utah 
income tax return. (See Respondent's Exhibit 7, "HAU 1998 TC-20S", Schedule A, In. 6.) 
29. Mr. Whitworth died in 1998. (See Respondent's Exhibit 4, p. 4, % 22.) 
30. The Mandells changed their domicile and permanently moved to the state of Nevada in 
1999. For the tax year in question, 2001, they were no longer Utah resident individuals for state income 
tax purposes. 
31. After Whitworth's death, Mr. Mandell learned that Mr. Whitworth had not fairly 
allocated the purchase price from Champion Homes and the cash portion of the purchase price to HAU. 
In 2000, Mandell filed a Complaint in the Second Judicial District Court of the State of Nevada, County 
Washau, against the Estate of Whitworth et al (CV0002977). (See Respondent's Exhibit 4.) 
32. The Complaint contained the following allegations. 
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"[Mandell" [has] discoveied that the allocations of the purchase price affixed by Whitworth for 
each corpoiation were not based upon the actual values of each corporation compared to the total 
purchase price offered by Champion Homes Center, Inc. Instead, Whitworth's allocation inflated 
the values of those companies that he exclusively owned or where he had a large percentage of 
ownership. These allocations decreased the true value of [Mandell's] ownership in [HAU] 
(See Respondent's Exhibit 4, f 19.) 
33. The Complaint further alleged, 
Whitworth also allocated a substantially larger percentage of the cash proceeds of the purchase 
price to himself as compared to the cash paid to [Mandell]. [Mandell was] left relying upon 
achieving the uncertain performance criteria for the bulk of [his] allocated purchase price. On 
information and belief, Whitworth has transferred and assigned to the Gene Whitworth Trust 
payments of money, effects and other value things, received by Whitworth as a result of his 
disproportion allocation of purchase price and cash payments to the Homes America Sale. 
(See Respondent's Exliibit 4, fk 20 and 21.) 
34. The damages requested in the Complaint consisted of a constructive trust upon the 
proceeds received by Mr. Whitworth which were disproportionate and which should have been paid to 
Mr. Mandell (See Respondent's Exhibit 4, p.9.) 
35. Mr. Mandell settled the Complaint in 2001 and reported a taxable gain from such 
settlement of $1,127,977. The confidential Settlement Agreement released and discharged any claim 
alleged in the Compliant. (See Respondent's Exliibit 3.) As a result of the settlement of the complaint an 
additional payment of $1,127,977, this brought the total payment to Mr. Mandell to approximately SI.75 
million. The original allocation set forth in the purchase agreement had been $1,671 million. (See 
Respondent's Exhibits 2 and 6.) 
36. Kenneth Stieha prepared the Mandells5 2001 federal income tax return, and he testified 
that regardless of the nature of the claim, the damages related to Mandell's interest hi HAU should be 
reported as a capital gain, not as ordinary income. 
40. Mr. Mandell leported his share of the additional sale proceeds received under the 
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settlement on his federal 2001 income tax return, Schedule D, Part II, as a long term capital gain on the 
sale of his "20% stock interest of Homes America of Utah, Inc., sold on 9/15/01." (See Respondent's 
Exhibit 2, p. 7.) 
41. The Estate of Whitworth took an IRC § 1341(a) claim of right credit on its 2001 1041 
federal income tax return to offset the settlement precedes it paid to Mandell in 2001 against the income 
previously recognized by Whitworth in 1998 from the original sale. (See Respondent's Exhibit 9.) 
42. In 2001, the Estate of Whitworth attempted to file an amended 1998 Utah State Income Tax 
Return reducing its Utah gain recognized from the sale of Whitworth's stock by the amount of the 
settlement proceeds paid to Mandell in 2001. (See Respondent's Exhibit 9, "Estate of Whitworth's 2001 
Amended Utah TC-40.") 
APPLICABLE LAW 
Utah Code Ann. § 59-7-702 (2000) 
Utah Code Ann. § 59-10-116 (2000) 
Utah Code Ann. § 59-10-117(1) (2000) 
Utah Code Ann, § 59-10-117(2)(a)(d) (2000) 
Utah Code Ann. § 59-10-118 (2000) 
Utah Code Ann. § 59-10-543 (2000) 
CONCLUSION OF LAW 
1. The threshold issue before this Commission is whether the net settlement proceeds 
received by Mandell in 2001 of $1,127,977.00 are subject to Utah State Income Tax. To make this 
determination, we must first determine the character and nature of the settlement proceeds. The 
Commission agrees with Respondent that for tax purposes the character and nature of settlement or 
litigation proceeds are determined by asking the question, "In lieu of what were the damages awarded?" 
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See Pennzoil Company v. Department of Revenue, 33 P 3d 314, 317 (Or. 2001) (citations omitted) and 
Hort v. Commission, 313 U.S. 28 (1941). The Commission concludes that the settlement proceeds 
essentially represent the amount Mr. Mandell should have received for his HAU stock in 1998. 
2. As the amount of the litigation proceeds are in lieu of funds that Mr. Mandell should have 
received at the time he v/as a Utah resident and had sold the stock in his Utah business, the funds are 
taxable as Utah Source income pursuant to Utah Code Sees. 59-10-116,117 & 118, 
3. The Commission has the authority to waive penalties upon a showing of reasonable cause 
and finds sufficient cause to do so in this matter, Utah Code Sec. 59-1-401(11). Respondent had issued 
against Petitioner both 10% failure to file penalties and 10% failure to pay penalties pursuant to Utah 
Code Sec. 59-1-401 (1)&(2). 
ANALYSIS 
This question before the Commission is whether the settlement proceeds paid to Mr 
Mandel are subject to Utah tax considering Mr. Mandell was no longer a Utah resident at the time the 
lawsuit was filed or settled. The income relates back to Kir. Mendel's sale of stock of HAU in 1998 when 
he was a Utah resident and the cause of action settled was to obtain a fair allocation of the purchase price 
for Mr. Mandell hi fact, upon receipt of the settlement funds in 2001, Mr. Mandell included them on his 
federal tax return as a capital gain from the sale of the stock of HAU. 
On the other hand Petitioner argues the fraud action was against Mr. Witworth who was 
not a party to the stock agreement, but who had caused Mr. Mandell to enter into fee stock purchase 
agreement. As petitioner argues a "chose of action" is an intangible and the proceeds would be taxable to 
the state of residence. In this case Nevada. Petitioner points out that Champion acquired 100% of the 
stock in HAU in 1998 
Upon review of the information and arguments in this matter, the Commission concludes 
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Respondent is correct in that the way to determine whether the settlement income at issue is taxable is 
determine the character and nature of the settlement proceeds. It is settled law that for tax purposes the 
character and nature of settlement or litigation proceeds are determined by asking the question, "In lieu of 
what were the damages awarded?15 See Pennzoil 33 P.3d 314, 317 (Or. 2001) (citations omitted) and 
Hortv. Commission, 313 U.S. 28 (1941). 
The evidence before the Commission is Mandell's Complaint filed against the Estate of 
Whitworth that gave rise to the settlement. Mandell alleged in the complaint the following: 
On information or belief, Whitworth has transferred and assigned to the Gene Whitworth 
Trust payments and money, effects and other valuable things, received by Whitworth as 
result of this disproportion allocation purchase price and cash payments to the Homes 
America sale. 
(See Respondent's Exhibit 6, % 21.) 
Considering the facts in this matter it is the position of the Commissioners that the 
damages sought in the Mandells' complaint and the related motion for summary judgment were based 
upon the fact that Mr. Whitworth had received money from Champion that should have been paid to Mr. 
Mandell arising from Champion's purchase of the HAU and the other eight entities stock. This 
conclusion is consistent with the testimony of Mandell's accountant and Mandell's 2001 federal income 
tax return that reported the settlement proceeds as a capital gain. 
The fact that Mandell recovered the proceeds from Champion through a lawsuit against 
Whitworth does not alter our conclusion, hi Pennzoil v. Department of Rev., 33 P.3d 314, (Or. 2001) and 
Pennzoil v. Dept. of Rev., 15 Or. Tax 101 (Or. Tax Regular Div. 2000), the Oregon Supreme Court and 
Tax Court were faced with a similar issue. There, Pennzoil was seeking damages against Texaco 
resulting from Texaco's tortious interference of PennzoiPs contract with Getty Oil. The Oregon Courts 
were not concerned that Pennzoil leceived the litigation proceeds from Texaco, not Getty Oil. The 
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Oregon tax court noted: "It is the same as if Pennzoil said to Texaco you stole our deal pay us what we 
would have benefited. In the court's view it does not matter whether the contract was stolen, condemned 
or interfered with or cancelled; the income realized from it by Pennzoil was income "arising from" that 
contract." Pennzoil, 15 Or.Tax 109. The Oregon Supreme Court similarly stated, "We conclude that 
Pennzoil received the settlement proceeds in lieu of its agreement with Getty and that agreement gave rise 
to the disputed income.5'' Pennzoil 33 P.3d at 317. 
Having determined the nature and character of the settlement proceeds, we must 
determine whether such proceeds are subject to Utah income tax. The Division offers three independent 
basis for taxation: (i) the proceeds are Utah source income because they relate to a sale of Utah assets; (ii) 
the proceeds are Utah source income under Utah Code Ann. § 59-10-117(l)(b) since they represent the 
payment for services rendered in Utah; and (iii) the MandelPs right to the proceeds were fixed when they 
were residents, and a subsequent change in domicile does not alter the taxability of the proceeds by Utah. 
We must only find a basis under one of the above three alternatives to sustain the Division's Statutory 
Notice of Deficiency and conclude that the proceeds are taxable to Utah as they pertain to the sale of Utah 
assets. 
The original HAU - Champion transaction involved an IRC § 338(h)(10) election. The IRC § 
338(h)(10) resulted in the sale being treated for tax purposes as if HAU sold all of its assets to Champion 
with a subsequent liquidation of the proceeds to the shareholders. As such, the gain on the sale of the 
assets is reorganized by HAU. 
Utah Code Ann. § 59-7-702(2)(b) requires that "a nonresident shareholder shall recognize 
a portion of a S corporation's Utah taxable income derived from Utah sources... in accordance with Utah 
Code Aim. § 59-10-317 and Utah Code Ann. § 59-10-118." Utah Code Ann. § 59-10-117(d) provides 
that "A nonresident shareholder's distributive share of ordinary income, gain, loss and deduction from or 
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connected with Utah sources shall be determined under Section 59-10-118." Section 59-10-118 provides 
that the ''business income" shall be apportioned to Utah and "non-business53 income from intangible 
sources allocated to the "commercial domicile " 
HAU reported the gain recognized in 1998 as business income and it was apportioned all 
to Utah The allocated purchase price under the purchase agreement was $1,605,000. Because of 
Whitworth's actions, Mandell received only $621,000 of this amount in 1998. Mandell received and 
additional $1,127,977 from the settlement in 2001, for a total of $1,748,977. 
The Commission is convinced that had Whitworth received the settlement proceeds in 
1998 under the purchase agreement, that such proceeds would clearly have been Utah source income 
under the statutes discussed above and finds that it makes no difference that the proceeds were paid m the 
form of settlement as opposed to the original transaction. The proceeds reflect the reallocation of the 
Champion sale proceeds from Whitworth and the other corporations controlled by Whitworth to HAU 
consistent with the value of the assets sold. The reallocation does not alter the nature or source of the 
purchase price 
Considering the issue of the failure to file and failure to pay penalties, although the 
Commission concludes that the law in this matter is clear and that Petitioner should have filed and paid 
Utah individual income taxes on the income at issue in 2001, this is a very complicated area of law and 
certainly difficult for Petitioners to understand that they would need to file Utah returns on the mcome 
when they were residents of Nevada at the time they had received the income. For this reason the 
Commission finds sufficient reasonable cause for waiver of the penalties 
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CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing the commission sustain the Division's Statutory7 Notice of Estimated 
Income Tax as it pertains to the tax and interest. However, the Commission waives the penalties. It is so 
ordered. 
BY ORDER OF THE UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION: 
DATED this j j ) day of J ^ O l T ,2006. lis If  davof jA^UjT 
Pain Hendrickson 
Commission Chair 
• & : • 
\& \ 
ABSENT 
R. Bruce Johnson 
Commissioner 
\l 
"flri 
?almer DePaulis 
Commissioner 
MarcB. Johns, 
Commission^ 
Notice of Appeal Rights and Payment Requirement: You have twenty (20) days after the date of this 
order to file a Request for Reconsideration with the Tax Commission Appeals Unit pursuant to Utah Code 
Sec. 63-46b~13. A Request for Reconsideration must allege newly discovered evidence or a mistake of 
law or fact. If you do not file a Request for Reconsideration with the Commission, this order constitutes 
final agency action. You have thirty (30) days after the date of this order to pursue judicial review of this 
order in accordance with Utah Code Sec. 59-1-601 and 63-46b-13 et. seq. Failure to pay the balance 
resulting from this Older within thirty (30) days fiom the date of this order may result in a late payment 
penalty. 
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